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ABSTRACT 
 
VASSALS, SERVA	TS A	D TRAITORS: IMAGE OF SERBS I	 POPULAR 
TURKISH HISTORIOGRAPHY 
 
 
 
Murat Öziş 
 
History, M.A. Thesis, 2012 
 
Thesis Supervisor: Selçuk Akşin Somel 
 
 
Keywords: Popular Turkish Historiography; Ottoman-Serbian History;  
Serbs in the Ottoman Empire;  ationalism 
 
 
This study is established around the pre-1990 popular historiography in the Turkish 
Republic with a specific focus on depictions of Serbia and Serbs in the Ottoman 
Empire. By analyzing the events and characters from both early (i.e. the fourteenth and 
fifteenth centuries) and late Ottoman history, the aim is to understand how the 
established image(s) of ‘Serbia’ and ‘Serbs’ functions within  popular Turkish 
historiography, a discipline which addresses a considerable portion of the society. This 
work, in order to achieve a comprehensive historiography survey, consists of the 
evaluations of the narratives of the authors with diversified political backgrounds. By 
doing so the thesis strives to understand the similarities and divergences among the 
authors and thus encourage a comparative discussion of historiography. For the 
comparison Western and Turkish academical works on Ottoman history, and for the 
theoretical framework studies regarding Turkish historiography, theories of nationalism 
were used. As a result, this study offers a broad, representative and yet critical reading 
of the Turkish historiography on the common histories of the Ottoman Empire and 
Serbia as well as examples and indications of anachronisms, distortions and 
instrumentalization of the history. 
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ÖZET 
 
VASALLAR, KULLAR VE HAĐ	LER: POPÜLER TÜRK TARĐH YAZIMI	DA 
SIRP ĐMGESĐ 
 
 
Murat Öziş 
 
Tarih, Yüksek Lisans Tezi, 2012 
 
Tez Danışmanı: Selçuk Akşin Somel 
 
 
Anahtar Sözcükler: Popüler Türk Tarih Yazımı; Osmanlı-Sırbistan Tarihi; 
Osmanlı Đmparatorluğu’nda Sırplar; Milliyetçilik  
 
 
Bu çalışma 1990 öncesi Türkiye Cumhuriyeti popüler tarih yazıcılığı çerçevesinde, 
Osmanlı Đmparatorluğu’ndaki Sırbistan ve Sırplar’a odaklanarak hazırlanmıştır. 
Buradaki amaç, hem erken hem de geç dönem Osmanlı tarihindeki olayları ve 
karakterleri inceleyerek, toplumun önemli bir kısmına hitap ettiği düşünülen popüler 
tarih çalışmalarında ortaya çıkan ‘Sırbistan’ ve ‘Sırp’ imgelerini anlamaktır. Bu 
çalışma, kapsamlı bir tarih yazımı araştırması yapmak amacıyla, çok çeşitli siyasi 
arkaplanlara sahip yazarların anlatılarının değerlendirilmesinden oluşmaktadır. Bu 
sayede yazarlar arasındaki benzerlik ve farklılaşmaları anlamak ve ortaya karşılaştırmalı 
bir tarih yazımı tartışması çıkarmak amaçlanmıştır. Kıyaslama amacıyla Batı’dan ve 
Türkiye’den Osmanlı tarihi üzerine yapılmış akademik çalışmalar; teorik çerçeve 
oluşturma amacıyla da Türk tarih yazımı ve milliyetçilik teorileri hakkındaki 
çalışmalardan faydalanılmıştır. Sonuç olarak, bu çalışma Osmanlı-Sırbistan ortak 
tarihleri hakkında geniş, temsil edici ve eleştirel bir Türk tarih yazımı okuması ve bu 
yazımdan anakronizm, çarpıtma ve tarihin araçsallaştırılması bulguları ve örnekleri  
sunmaktadır. 
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CHAPTER 1 
I	TRODUCTIO	 
 
As the writing and the teaching of the history is one of the most significant 
issues with regards to the self-identification of a given society, the method of 
writing, the selection of the issues, usage of the sources and paradigms that 
shape the perceptions of the historians gains great deal of importance. Therefore; 
it is no coincidence that most of the states direct and closely monitor the writing 
and teaching of the history, almost every nation-wide TV channel has a history 
program in its weekly schedule in Turkey and historical events have been used 
frequently by the movie producers. This way it could be seen that there is a two-
way relation between the writers and consumers in terms of the history where 
the state’s and society’s perception and practices interact in a complicated 
manner. 
 
1.1. Methodological Focus and Delimitations of the Research 
 
In this interaction, which brings about a common understanding of history in the 
society, Büşra Ersanlı Behar stresses the role of the state and preset official 
stance as the main determinant factor.1 In this context the state is extremely 
influential for the orientation of the historiography and the teaching of the 
history where some issues are highlighted with an unquestioning attitude and 
some are ignored. That apparently refers to the usage and modification of the 
history with a specific political program. 
 
That is not to claim or defend the existence of one and only true version of the 
history. As Hakan Erdem warns us, a historian should be aware of the 
differences between the information gained by the history and positive sciences 
and there could be more than one version and depiction of a particular section of 
                                                           
1
 Behar, B. E. (1992). Iktidar ve tarih : Türkiye’de “resmi tarih” tezinin olusumu, 1929-1937. Cagaloglu, 
Istanbul: AFA Yayincilik. 
2 
 
the history as “the history is not the past itself, rather is the collection of the 
written narratives that came from the mazy roads of human memory.”2 
 
On the other side of the interaction, the society’s attitude towards the history is 
extremely significant as well. Despite the extensive interest to history in the 
Turkish society, Erdem finds this relationship a very problematic one as most of 
the people love to talk but not to read, properly learn and question about the 
history.3 
 
It is understood that in the two way relationship of the creation of the historical 
knowledge, particularly in the Turkish Republic, the questions of “Who writes 
the history?” and “Who reads what was written?” are extremely valid ones if one 
wishes to understand the relation between the society and history. Therefore, this 
thesis was conceptualized in accordance with this relation and took the popular 
historiography in Turkey as the main informative source which is widely read by 
the society, reach many people and therefore has extremely significant influence 
on the understanding of the history. More particularly, in this work the issue and 
perception of the Serbs and Serbia in the Ottoman era as was held by the popular 
Turkish historiography is under investigation. In order to achieve this aim, 
narratives of popular historians from differing backgrounds, on the common 
histories of the Ottomans and Serbs will be compared not only with themselves 
but also with the western and academical historiography. 
 
Along with this selection of topic, it has firstly to be underlined that focus will 
be mainly on the Serbs and Serbia. However, when it is relevant it could be 
broadened to south Slavs, Croats, Bosnians, Montenegrins, Bulgarians and their 
lands as well. Also since the issues of the Janissaries and devshirme system in 
the Ottoman Empire has a lot to do with the Serbs; these two issues in the 
popular historiography will be in focus as well. 
 
                                                           
2
 Erdem, Y. H. (2008). Tarih-Lenk : kusursuz yazarlar, kâgittan metinler. Sisli, Istanbul: Dogan Kitap. p. 20. 
3
 Ibid. p. 329. 
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Secondly, in the selection that constituted the research of this thesis, popular 
historians and authors that have popular impact for historical knowledge were 
selected. Therefore, academically written works, examples from western 
historiography on the history of the Ottoman Empire and their authors were only 
used for comparison.  In addition, it is not however, claimed that the selection 
signifies an exhaustive list for the popular Turkish historiography. However, 
utmost sensitivity was shown in order to have a politically representative 
selection that could lead to a meaningful discussion. 
 
Thirdly, there has to be periodical limitation for this kind of study. The works in 
question in this thesis were selected from the period that is prior to the end of the 
Cold War and disintegration of Yugoslavia. By doing this, it is aimed that the 
negative contemporary influence of the Bosnian War on the historiography 
could be avoided. Also this time period indicates the historiography that has the 
greatest impact on the adults of today since it coincides with their youth. Surely, 
the study of post-1990 historiography for the common Ottoman-Serbian histories 
could be a very interesting topic for research, especially if compared to this one. 
 
With this introduction, so far, it is evident that there are certain issues that 
require further discussion for a useful and relevant discussion. The establishment 
of the official history thesis in Turkey and state’s stance regarding the history is 
vital in the Turkish context. Works by Etienne Copeaux4 and Büşra Ersanlı 
Behar5, in this regard are of great importance.  
 
Copeaux argues that the state apparatus and dominant political ideology are two 
extremely determinant elements in terms of the writing of the history and the 
creation of a common memory of the past for the society. Textbooks, in this 
sense, are one of the most significant instruments that carry this goal, as they 
transfer the preferred ideas to the younger section of the society through 
compulsory education where “a feeling of suspect does not accompany the 
                                                           
4
 Copeaux, E. (2006). Tarih Ders Kitaplarinda (1931-1993) : Türk Tarih Tezinden Türk-Islâm Sentezine. 
Istanbul: Iletisim Yayinlari. 
5
 Behar, B. E. (1992). Iktidar ve tarih : Türkiye’de “resmi tarih” tezinin olusumu, 1929-1937. Cagaloglu, 
Istanbul: AFA Yayincilik. 
4 
 
reading process” mostly.6 It has to be underlined, as Copeaux further argues, that 
the common memory of the society is closely related to the discourse in the 
textbooks.7 This is exactly why popular historiography carries a similar duty for 
the society: It could serve as the tool for the reproduction of the history that is 
taught in the schools, hence; assuring the continuation of the designated 
common memory of the society.  
 
Copeaux also believe that the historical narratives are useful for the definition of 
the other and the enemy which is directly related with the identity construction 
as societies define themselves in relation to and not being the same with the 
others.8 After this note, Copeaux informs the readers about his selection of the 
examples of Arabs, Greeks and Armenians who are the closest to Turks as 
defining others.9 Likewise, in this thesis, the image of the Serbs was selected as 
the defining other who have been close to Turks as well. 
 
As Copeaux writes mainly about the textbooks in order to explain the influence 
of the state, government and sources of ideological oppression, Büşra Ersanlı 
Behar too focuses on the establishment of the official history thesis and its 
integration into historiography. In this regard the First Turkish History Congress 
that was held in 1932 is significant.  According to Behar, the official history 
thesis that was formulated in this congress had two basic goals: Firstly, 
establishment of a strong nationalistic conscious that is related with the pre-
Ottoman era and, secondly, creating a natural scientific basis for this conscious, 
such as; archeology.10 If that is possible to ascribe a final goal for the writing 
and teaching of the history and if instrumentalization of the history is a state 
sponsored policy then why not to write selective and functional narratives to 
reach that goal? This very issue is an extremely sensitive one since “the writing 
and teaching of the history is one of the most permanent and significant aspects 
                                                           
6
 Copeaux, E. (2006). Tarih Ders Kitaplarinda (1931-1993) : Türk Tarih Tezinden Türk-Islâm Sentezine. p. 
3. 
7
 Ibid. p. 1. 
8
 Ibid. p. 4.  
9
 Ibid. p. 9. 
10
 Behar, B. E. (1992). Iktidar ve tarih : Türkiye’de “resmi tarih” tezinin olusumu, 1929-1937. p. 12. 
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of the mind-mapping of a society.”11 In fact, the ideas that were raised by 
Copeaux and Behar indicate the significance of this work as well. Similar to the 
textbooks, here, popular historiography, and the Serbian case in the Ottoman 
history more particularly, will be in question which has the power of shaping the 
mind-mapping of the society as well. 
 
Furthermore, it is discussed that French and German romantic and idealist 
historiography that gained a momentum with the rise of the nation state politics 
and its relation with history, had a significant impact on the official history 
thesis that was embraced in the early period of the Turkish Republic. States in 
the nineteenth and early twentieth century employed their means to, first write a 
nationalist history and, secondly, to transfer the written history to national 
collective memory.12 
 
While the positivist historiography of the French and the idealist and statist 
historiography of the Germans were extremely influential on the Turkish 
historiography in the early republican period, these understandings of the history 
were being questioned in their homelands as early as the late 19th century. Such 
as Annales School criticized the positivist approach and advocated for a more 
interdisciplinary point of view. However, Behar argues that this critical approach 
to the historiography did not find itself a place in terms of an intellectual tool 
among the Turkish historians. They simply took historiography as a government 
policy, rather than a problematic field of thought.13 In other words, the writing 
and teaching of the history in Turkey completely became a matter of and tool for 
national identity building efforts. At this point it is seen that nationalism and 
historiography is tightly interconnected. 
 
As the issue of nation-building and nationalism were described as one of the 
main forces behind the history writing in Turkey, it is a must to refer to modern 
theories of nationalism. Firstly, Anthony Smith suggests that national identity 
                                                           
11
 Behar, B. E. (1992). Iktidar ve tarih : Türkiye’de “resmi tarih” tezinin olusumu, 1929-1937. p. 12. 
12
 Ibid. p. 21. 
13
 Ibid. p. 23. 
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involves some sense of political community. Accordingly, two paths of 
formulation could be identified for the nation: the civic and ethnic models. The 
civic model is predominantly a territorial conception where nations possess a 
compact and well-defined territory. Regarding the land, Smith argues that it has 
to be “the historic land, the homeland, the cradle of our people, even where, as 
with the Turks, it is not the land of ultimate origin.” Furthermore in the ethnic 
model, that Smith argues, the emphasis is on community of birth and native 
culture which is mostly valid for Eastern European and Asian conceptions of the 
nation.14 Combining elements from both perceptions, Anthony Smith, defines 
the nation as a “named human population sharing an historic territory, common 
myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and 
common legal rights and duties for all members.”15 
 
Secondly; Ernest Gellner, argues that nations and nationalisms are not natural 
but they are rather results of industrialization. According to Gellner, in the 
industrial societies pressure to combine the state, the population and the culture 
creates the nations.16 
 
Thirdly, in Benedict Anderson’s famous conception, the nation is defined as an 
imagined political community. As he states, “[i]t is imagined because the 
members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-
members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the 
image of their communion.”17 Although there are many other valuable and 
recent works that cover the issue of nationalism,18 it is beyond the capacity of 
this work to discuss them all in detail. 
                                                           
14
 Smith, A. D. (1991). National identity. Reno: University of Nevada Press. p. 9. 
15
 Smith, A. D. (1991). National identity, p. 14. My italics. 
16
 Gellner, E. (1983). Nations and nationalism. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
17
 Anderson, B. R. O. (1991). Imagined communities : reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism. 
London; New York: Verso, pp. 6-7. 
18
 Anderson, B. R. O. (1991). Imagined communities: reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism. 
London; New York: Verso; Armstrong, J. A. (1982). Nations before nationalism. Chapel Hill, N.C.: Univ. of 
North Carolina Pr.; Breuilly, J. (1994). Nationalism and the state. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.; 
Gellner, E. (1983). Nations and nationalism. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. ;Hobsbawm, E. J. (1995). 
Nations and nationalism since 1870: programme, myth, reality. Cambridge [etc.]: Cambridge University 
Press.; Hroch, M. (2000). Social preconditions of national revival in Europe: a comparative analysis of the 
7 
 
 
Besides broad theories of nationalism particular cases of nationalisms that 
relates to the aims of this thesis could be mentioned as well. In this regard, 
Eugene Weber discusses the French case in his book Peasants into Frenchmen, 
and depicts how “savage” people without ‘language’ (i.e. Parisian French) and 
culture (i.e. the culture of Paris) became Frenchmen with the civilizing influence 
of industrialization and education.19 It is understood that this was perceived as a 
project, something to be built from scratch, not to polish what already was out 
there.  
 
Furthermore, Anthony Smith provides the Turkish example in his conception of 
nationalisms. According to Smith, Kemal Ataturk’s reforms “engineered the 
secession of the Turkish heartlands from the Ottoman empire” which redefined 
the empire as a territorial unit that is aligned to ethnic Turks of Anatolia. These 
efforts, surely, required the creation of certain ethnic myths, history and values.20 
 
It could be seen in the conceptions of the nation that there is a great emphasis on 
the history and concepts that relate to it. Therefore, the selection of the issues, 
the sources, evaluation of them and the writing, that is the historiography, is one 
of the most significant issues that define and explain about a nation. In the whole 
historiography, a special place must be given to the popular historians and their 
narratives as they could be regarded as the most read ones, hence a very 
influential section among the authors.   
 
In this regard, it could be very useful to investigate the authors that had a great 
deal of influence over the contemporary Turkish society with the books they 
published. The high number of the book sales, their books’ common availability 
in house libraries, some being statesmen and columnists could be thought as 
elements to strengthen the idea that they have been influential for shaping the 
mindset, understanding of the past (i.e. ‘Turkish’ history) and average historical 
                                                                                                                                                                          
social composition of patriotic groups among the smaller European nations. New York: Columbia 
University Press.; Smith, A. D. (1988). The ethnic origins of nations. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
19
 Weber, E. (1976). Peasants into Frenchmen. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press. pp. 4-6. 
20
 Smith, A. D. (1991). National identity. pp. 103-104. 
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consciousness of the Turkish society. Eissenstat argues the history and 
historiography of the Turkish Republic are fundamentally tied to Turkish 
identity politics. As in all states, the process of nation building and the 
elaboration of a national history have gone hand in hand.”21 
 
 
1.2. Organization of the Study 
 
Within the theoretical framework that relates to historiography and nationalism, 
this thesis is structured around the narratives that concern the Serbs and Serbia in 
the Ottoman era that are found in the popular historiography in the Turkish 
Republic roughly until 1990s when the region in question suffered bloody wars. 
By looking into the same events or periods and persons from different authors 
with differing political backgrounds, a comparison between these authors as well 
as a general comparison with the academical and western historiography was 
aimed to be made. As outcomes, it is expected to have a general survey of the 
Ottoman-Serbian common history, reach to collectively depicted images of the 
Serbs and Serbia in the Ottoman Empire and compare the political stances of the 
authors with their narratives within the parameters of popular historiography. 
Furthermore, only the periods of early (ca. 1350-1500) and late (ca. 1800-1900) 
Ottoman history was taken into question since these are the periods that Serbs 
and Serbia were mentioned. The period in between, namely the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries, is a time that especially popular historians do not refer to 
Serbs and Serbia in manner that allows for a comparison.  
 
In this regard, the authors in question had to be located onto a range of political 
orientations. In order to do this orientation Etienne Copeaux’s work22 and the 
backgrounds of the authors were used. Collectively, this led to a quadripartite 
structure: (1) The rightist and nationalist approach, (2) extreme rightist/racist 
approach, (3) Islamist approach and (4) leftist approach. However; it is 
important to note that this is a broad generalization and with regards to time, 
                                                           
21
 Eissenstat, H. (2003). History and Historiography: Politics and Memory in the Turkish Republic. 
Contemporary European History, 12(1), 93–105. doi:10.1017/S096077730300105X, p. 103. 
22
Copeaux, E. (2006). Tarih Ders Kitaplarinda (1931-1993): Türk Tarih Tezinden Türk-Islâm Sentezine. 
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political situation and nature of a particular work that a given author wrote, his 
or her orientation might shift from one to another. Even among the issues that 
the historian deals with there might be differences in approach and reaction. This 
problem was tried to be solved through explanatory comments that follows the 
issue or with the underlining of the significance of the given subject. 
 
In the rightist and nationalist approach the authors are supportive of and/or close 
to the politics of Democrat Party (DP) and Justice Party (Adalet Partisi – AP). 
They are in the center right wing of the Turkish politics. In this work Yılmaz 
Öztuna, Yusuf Akçura and Zuhuri Danışman were evaluated in this framework. 
 
The extreme rightist authors are differentiated from the nationalist ones with the 
heavy stress on ethnicity and race in their works. Đsmail Hami Danişmend and 
Rıza Nur are the authors in this category. 
 
Islamist authors are defined with their cautious and critical stance in regards to 
politics of Turkish Republic and principles of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. More 
importantly, their emphasis on Islamic values and evaluation of the Ottoman 
Empire with an Islamic sensitivity are apparent and determinant. Ziya Nur 
Aksun and Necip Fazıl Kısakürek are regarded in this group. 
 
Finally, the leftist, are the authors, as the name suggests, that are located in the 
left wing of the politics. In this sense Doğan Avcıoğlu, Stefan Yerasimos, Sina 
Akşin and Kemal Tahir are the authors that belong to this category. It should be 
also underlined that, the leftist tradition and authors in Turkey sometimes show 
characteristics that are similar to nationalists. 
 
In order to achieve a useful comparison and discussion surely right questions has 
to be asked. For the purposes of this work, questions that were asked are “How 
Turkish popular historians perceive Serbs and Serbia in the Ottoman history?”, 
“Are there varying perceptions and ideas regarding this specific issue among the 
historians?” and “What could be the impact of the political backgrounds of the 
authors with regards to the writing of the history?” 
 
10 
 
By asking these questions and keeping the aforementioned theoretical 
framework in mind, Serbian history in the Ottoman Empire over the works of 
the popular historians, three chapters were designed in this thesis. The first 
chapter is concerned with the period of 1350-1475, starting with the first 
encounter and battle of Serbs with the Ottomans occurred as the beginning and 
ends with the annexation of Serbia into the Ottoman Empire. The second chapter 
discusses the whole nineteenth century with regards to Serbia and Ottoman 
Empire that witnessed the Serbian insurrections, nationalisms and disintegration 
of the Empire. The third chapter, finally, takes up the issue of prominent Serbian 
characters in the early Ottoman era. It also includes discussions on the 
perceptions of the Janissaries and devshirme pashas since it is closely related 
with the Serbs as being one of the mostly levied societies. 
 
A final note has to be made regarding the usages of the national and ethnic terms 
as they might be misleading. Kafadar, in this regard, believes that historians 
have the duty to tackle the nationalistic assumptions and the idea of continuous 
national identity. He finds the assumptions on the linearity of the Turkishness 
from Inner Asia to modern day Turkey extremely problematic.23 Speaking of the 
Ottoman Empire, both Kafadar and Lowry24 gives the example of Köse Mihal 
(Mikhalis the Beardless), “one of the founding fathers of the Ottoman state, a 
Bithynian Christian who joined forces with Osman”25 in order to underline the 
cosmopolitan and multiethnic nature of the Ottoman state right from the 
beginning. He further states that “[t]he essentialist trap cannot be avoided unless 
we, the historians, problematize the use of "the Turks" (or any other ethnonym 
for that matter), systematically historicize it and confront its plasticity, and study 
its different meanings over time and place”26 which could be regarded as one of 
the most critical aspects of the popular historiography in question. 
 
                                                           
23
 Kafadar, C. (1996). Between two worlds : the construction of the Ottoman state. Berkeley: University 
of California Press, pp. 23-27. 
24
 Lowry, H. W. (2003). The nature of the early Ottoman state. Albany: State University of New York 
Press, p. 117-118. 
25
 Kafadar, C. (1996). Between two worlds : the construction of the Ottoman state. p. 26. 
26
 Ibid. p. 26. 
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Therefore the usages of the term ‘Turkish army’ as well as the ‘Serbian army’, 
for instance, in the fourteenth century become misleading in two aspects. Firstly, 
as Kafadar argues, with the usage of the national terminology that is being used 
today a direct continuity and linearity is ascribed to the armies and societies of 
the fourteenth century and the ones of the nineteenth, even twenty-first centuries. 
Secondly, this approach, which is derived from the contemporary nation state 
idea, clearly refers to a unitary and monolithic structure. However; under the 
conditions of the fourteenth century, the time of fluctuating ties of vassaldom 
and volatile alliances, the idea of holistic state, army or society seems to be 
going too far. Regarding the usages of these terms in this work, it has to be said 
that (1) the terms ‘Turk’ and ‘Turkish’ are frequently kept as they are when 
borrowed from the popular historiography, in order to stress the problematic 
common usage and (2) the terms ‘Serb’ and ‘Serbian’ are used for the sake of 
the simplicity with the discussed critical attitude. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
CO	FRO	TATIO	 A	D DISSOLUTIO	: 1350-1475 
 
 
This chapter is predominantly concerned with the 1350-1475 period which starts 
with the first encounter of the Ottomans with the Serbs and ends with the 
complete incorporation of the Serbian lands into the Empire. The transition of 
the perception of the Serbs follows the track of the ‘equals’ in the political 
aspirations, to ‘enemies’ to be fought in the struggles for supremacy in the 
Balkans and then to ‘vassals’ and ‘servants’ as partially or wholly incorporated 
elements of the empire. It has to be noted that these labellings are broad 
generalizations and they could overlap at a given time period. 
 
Before going into the narratives of the popular historians, brief introdcution of a 
famous author and his literary work might be beneficial. Kemal Tahir in this 
regard is not a historian, however; he, being popular and influencial for the 
establishment of the history understanding in the Turkish society with his 
historical novels, such as; Yediçınar Yaylası, Yorgun Savaşçı and, surely, Devlet 
Ana27 is a significant figure. He is also regarded as a leftist writer who is not 
directly against the Ottoman system.  In Devlet Ana, where the story of the 
establishment of the Ottoman principality as a distinct polity is told, it is possible 
to find information on and references to Ottoman state system and Ottoman 
settlement in the Balkans, although the actual time frame that the novel does not 
encompass the abovementioned 1350-1475 period. However; the author 
obviously knows what will come in the aftermath of the establishment period 
and uses some dialoges and expressions from the mouth of the main characters, 
such as; Osman Bey, in order to depict an envisioned state system right from the 
beginning. These references, occasionally, could be applied to the to-be-
incorporated Serbs as well, as they bear the specialty of living in the the west, 
being christian and a peasant society. 
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 Kemal Tahir. (1994). Devlet ana : roman. Istanbul: Tekin Yayinevi; Kemal Tahir. (2005). Yorgun savasçi. 
Istanbul: Ithaki; Kemal Tahir. (2008). Yediçinar yaylasi. Istanbul: Ithaki. 
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For instance, Kemal Tahir describes an Ottoman ideal state system over a speech 
by Osman Bey, which will be applied to the future conquests in the west, that is 
the Byzantine lands. Osman Bey says:  
 
“Byzantines of Istanbul came from the dark world of the West. But, 
they could not make use of the slavery system of the Western world 
here. … That system is based on the enslavement of the peasantry. 
Who wants to become slave? So you have to force them continously! 
With constant coercion, what happens to a man? He becomes 
dehumanized! … We will not shock and frighten the Byzantine the 
peasants with an alien system! In contrast to slavery, Western pillage, 
oppression, racism we will provide toleance, cooperation, safety. Then 
of course those that work righteously will be with us… This is how 
the things will work for us.”28 
 
The explained ideals and system is the one that that Osman Bey envisages to 
implement to the Byzantine lands, which are mostly in the Balkans. Therefore 
the peasants in question should be the Bulgarians, Serbs, Bosnians and the alike. 
 
Furthermore, by making Osman Gazi speak, Kemal Tahir also have references to 
the societal structure and military composition that the Ottoman state should 
have. On the societal tolerance, Osman Bey says “We will not plunder! We will 
not try to spread religion. To the contrary we will respect everyone’s belief. We 
will not recognize difference among people based on religion, lineage or 
wealth!”29 Finally on the military system, he states “Raiders will be picked 
among the Greeks, because our raids are directed towards Greekness. And these 
are not raids of burning and plundering but of showing justice and giving trust.” 
In total, it is possible to understand that, no matter how the practice was 
afterwards, an ideal of just rule and tolerance as well as incorporation of the 
Christians into the Ottoman production and military system was perceived. 
According to the story in Kemal Tahir’s novel, the initial idea was to utilize a 
multi-ethnic and multi-religious system without making much emphasis to the 
Turkishness and Islam. 
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 Kemal Tahir. (1994). Devlet ana : roman. pp. 177-178. 
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 Ibid. p. 178. 
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2.1. From the First Encounter to the Battle of Kosovo 
 
The first phase of the relations between the Ottomans and Serbs signify a clash 
between the equally potentially strong states and a growing connection between 
two regions, namely; north-western Asia Minor and the Balkans. 
 
As a predominant tendency the histories of the Ottoman Empire bear the name 
Turkish history. A Turkish history that will deal with the Ottoman history 
usually includes the Turkic populations migration from the central Asia around 
the fifth century and gives at least brief information on Seljukid Empire right 
before the emergence of the Ottoman beilik. This is both to do with the intention 
of providing a comprehensive historical perspective and the legitimacy concerns 
to some extend which will be focused in the coming chapters.  
 
Since the migration of Turkic populations happened via south and north of the 
Black Sea and directed towards the Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, at some 
point they met Slavs and some of the Turkish history books pay attention to this 
set of events. For instance; one of the leftist Turkish authors in question, Doğan 
Avcıoğlu in his five volume work Türklerin Tarihi (“History of the Turks”) 
includes this chapter of Turkish History when Avars imposed their rule in the 
norther Balkans. However in the year 626 khan of the Avars becomes 
unsuccesful in his campaign on the Slavs and the state loses its influence on 
them. Czech, Serbs and other Slavic gorups gains independence. Serbs make 
coalition with Croats to overcome Turks and move southwards and settle to their 
“contemporary” lands by which Avcıoğlu must have meant Yugoslavia as his 
book was published in 1987. Also Avar Turks lost their influence over the Slavs 
of Macedonia and had to pull back as north as modern Hungary, surrounded by 
hostile Slavs. More importantly, according to Avcıoğlu, Slavization of the 
Balkans happened due to Avars and their political and military actions. It is also 
interesting to note that while in Avcıoğlu obviously provides the reader with 
more detailed information on Bulgars and Magyars as they have Turkic 
background, on Serbs a little less could be found30. Avcıoğlu’s inclusion of early 
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 Avcıoğlu, D. (1992). Türklerin tarihi (Vol. 2). Istanbul: Tekin Yayinevi. pp. 783-793. 
15 
 
Turkic settlements and appearances in the Balkans might be to do with the 
legitimacy concerns and providing proof for rightful future re-settlements in the 
coming centuries. Also it should be noted that, regarding the Serbs, this is all 
that is available in Avcıoğlu’s narrative. 
 
Another writer that belongs to leftist tradition is Stefanos Yerasimos. In his PhD 
thesis, although not directly about Serbian lands or people, there are 
explanations regarding the dynamics of the Balkan lands and the Ottoman rule 
that is being established starting from the second half of the fourteenth century 
onwards. According to Yerasimos, “the conquest and colonization of the Balkan 
lands” was not a single-handedly controlled phenomena from Bursa, rather it 
was due to the ambitions of the ghazi beys (“Muslim warrior lords”) and 
Anatolian war lords who wanted to gain more incomes and land, hence more 
fiefs. It is important to note here that Yerasimos does not make distinction 
between the war lords according to their ethinc background as some of them 
were Christian converts from Rum and Serbian territories. These people by 
forcing north-west into the Balkans, were transforming and defining wealth and 
resources in the region. One other advantage for the beys to do so was actually 
the fact that the more they pushed further towards north-west the less control 
could be imposed upon them by the center who was willing to design the new 
lands in accordence with their class based interests.31 With this approach 
Yerasimos is a distinctive figure among the historians, both for leftist and 
rightist ones. Instead of giving an event based political history, as many others 
do, he uses the economical aspect and class as the basis of argumentation. 
Furthermore; Yerasimos underlines that besides the economic ambitions, 
religious tarikats (“sufi orders”) and sheikhs were another significant supporting 
element for Ottoman expansion in the Balkans yet this must predominantly be 
related with regions like Albania, Bosnia and Macedonia. In my research I have 
not came across to any reference to Islamic religious settlements in the Serbian 
territories. 
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2.1.1. Dušan and Orhan 
 
Roughly after 1330s, with Dušan’s succession to Serbian throne as a successful 
commander and law maker, Serbian Kingdom became the most significant and 
organized political power in the Balkans. It is understood that Dušan perceived 
Ottoman state as a serious rival that his interests could contradict, he offered his 
daughter Teodora to Orhan in order to achieve Ottoman neutrality.32 However 
his efforts did not eventually yield the result he expected. 
 
Moving towards right in the spectrum of Turkish historians and authors, Đsmail 
Hami Danişmend is one of the most significant characters that is recognized and 
read popularly. In his four volume Đzahlı Osmanlı Tarihi Kronolojisi 
(“Chronology of Ottoman History with Explanations”) he deals with the issues 
choronologically and it is possible to extract great deal of information on 
Serbian history that relates the Ottomans. Although not physical, the first 
encounter of the Ottomans with Serbs goes back to Üsküdar Mülakatı (“Meeting 
of Üsküdar”) that was done between John V Cantacuzenus and Orhan Ghazi 
where Byzantine emperor secured some Ottoman support in his dealings with 
the Serbian King Dušan.33 At the time of Dušan Serbian Kingdom was on the 
rise and harming the Byzantine interests by capturing or plundering Byzantine 
fortresses and towns the Rumelia. Without further explicit explanation, it is still 
easy to understand Ottomans used some military sources against the rising 
Serbian Kingdom from the onset in Danişmend’s history. 
 
On this same subject Yılmaz Öztuna, too, pays much attention. Three important 
themes are significant in his writing on the nature of the states. First is that the 
Serbian Kingdom with their succesful leader Stefan Dušan was expanding 
politically and financially at the expense of Byzantine Empire’s lands in the 
southern Balkans especially into Macedonia. Secondly, the capture of Đznik and 
Bursa, two important trade and production centers in the region, was another 
sign of Byzantine decline who was deprived from rich tax resources and the 
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emergence of Turkish principality as a serious power base. Finally, Turks34 as a 
rising power base with a stable military force and expanding economy was a 
potential ally for both Orthodox ruler, one defensive and other that was at the 
attack. It was Byzantium who Orhan Bey decided to support eventually. This 
decision was a natural and simple one according to Öztuna, as he argues that it 
was completely in contradiction for the Turkish politics to support the 
establishment of a powerful Slavic state in the Balkans.35 Kunt, too, stresses that 
it would be dangerous for the Ottomans not to check Serbian imperial expansion 
towards south and counter-balace her by supporting the weak Byzantine 
Empire.36 
 
There are several outcomes that could be deduced from Öztuna’s approach to 
alliance issue. To advance towards the north-west into the Balkans and control 
the lands was of primary importance in Ottoman strategy right from the 
beginning and this was a planned act. Balkans is a land to be settled. Secondly, 
and more interestingly, there can be found many references to Slavic solidarity, 
Slavic danger37 and a common will among the Slavic people and rulers to act 
together. Although this approach’s explanatory power is obvious; it is also 
important to keep in mind that such an early Slavic solidarity could be premature 
and carry the traces of the bitter memories of the nineteenth century Ottoman 
retreat from her Balkan lands due to Panislavism and European politics. Thirdly, 
with the Üsküdar Mülakatı  in the year 1347 Orhan have the military power and 
confidence to promise for help to his father-in-law in his struggles within the 
empire and against the Serbian danger. Finally; in Öztuna’s history it is observed 
that while Ottomans could be moderate about the neighboring Byzantine Empire 
and there are ups and downs in the relations, the case for Serbian Kingdom is 
clear cut as simply being antagonistic. This makes the reader feel that the 
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Ottomans in this period locate themselves over being anti-Serbian and anti-
Slavic in their acts in the western border. Emphasize on the collaboration with 
Byzantines and the scarcity of information that was given regarding the 
Bulgarians could be translated as Öztuna ascribes specific importance to 
Serbian-Ottoman rivalry. This becomes clearer when a comparison is made 
between the states that the Ottomans and Ottoman war lords marched on. A 
rivalry and hostility could be one solution to define a newly established state as 
it has been the case for Turkish Republic as well. 
 
 
2.1.2. Sırpsındığı and Martisa (Çirmen): Myth and Reality 
 
Regarding the first significant combat that was narrated in the Turkish history 
books between the Ottomans and the Serbs, the Sırpsındığı Battle, there is a 
controversy whether that was actually the same one with the allegedly following 
Maritsa Battle of 1370/71 or there were two battles fought in six years time. 
Turkish historians have differing ideas about the issue.  
 
Recently Alexandar Şopov tried to answer this question by going over the 
Ottoman, Greek and Slavic sources in his thesis38. Main argument on the subject 
is that the only open-field battles and victories against a large enemy forces in 
the fourteenth century that was narrated in the Ottoman sources are Sırpsındığı 
of 766/1364 and Kosovo that took place in 791/1389. Slavic and Greek sources 
likewise indicate that two major battles of the second half of the fourteenth 
century are the Battle of Maritsa (Meriç) River (Çirmen Savaşı in Turkish) in 
1371 and Kosovo Battle of 1389.39 This comparison between the two lines of 
historiography shows an interesting point and a significant confusion. 
 
Likewise, Hakan Erdem underlines that the western historians that rely on Slavic 
sources concur regarding the singularity of the fight, namely the Battle of 
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Maritsa in 1371.40 It has to be stressed that although some hesitation could be 
observed in narratives of some historians, such as; Danişmend,41 the idea of two 
separate battles, especially with the help of the history textbooks for middle and 
highschools, still lives in the minds of too many Turkish people. That goes 
without saying that the Battle of Sırpsındığı is not accepted in the scholar 
historiography, just like western historiography as Hakan Erdem argues.  
 
Đsmail Hami Danişmend is one of the Turkish historians that has the critical view 
on the subject. He believes that in the Ottoman sources there is a confusion 
about these two wars in most cases which are under the influence of some 
legends that cannot be trusted.42 Although Danişmend seriously considers the 
possiblity that two wars could actully be the same he prefers to give in his 
chronologic work two wars as separate ones that took place in 1364 and 1371. In 
the Battle of Sırpsındığı, it is Hacı Đlbey’s expeditionary force of 10.000 soldiers 
that made a sudden attack to kill and scatter the most of the forces of the 
Hungarian King Lajos I (Louis I of Hungary), Serbian King Stefan Uroš V, 
Bosnian King Tvrtko I and Vlahian princes Bassarab and Lajko at night. 
Although critical and doubtful himself, Danişmend narrates a separate battle that 
took place in 1371, where Ottoman army led by Lala Şahin Pasha met 
Macedonian/Serbian despot Uglješa’s and Bulgarian King Šišman’s armies to 
“completely crush” them in Samako Valley. In this “terrific defeat” that Serbian 
forces faced Dušan’s all three sons were killed.43 After these wars that Ottomans 
were victorious and gain superiority in the region, it is mentioned that no 
significant power is left to stand against the Ottomans in Macedonia and 
southern Serbia. 
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Further, Danişmend explains that rapid expansion and conquests besides the 
significant battles were achieved due to successes of the akindjis (“raiders”) who 
were around 70 or 80 thousand cavalry men and they were predominantly of 
Turk race.44 Unlike the notion that is adopted by the scholarly history studies, 
such as; Finkel45, Barkey46 and Lowry47, the Ottomans are not Ottomans but 
Turks and their military power is not a coalition of Anatolian Turkish soldiers, 
converts or Christians from Byzantine Empire and to some extend Bulgarian and 
Serbian realms but almost purely Turks in Danişmend’s narrative. This historical 
understanding could be felt in most nationalist authors’ histories but usually not 
as clear as Danişmend in most cases. In addition, the issue of coalition and 
cosmopolitan nature of the Ottoman polity surely is a significant one and will be 
dealt in more detail in chapter III 
 
The Battle of Sırpsındığı, according to Rıza Nur was fought against the 4000 
Ottoman soldier that was led by Hacı Đlbey and an alliance of Bulgarian, 
Bosnian, Albanian and mostly Serbian army of 60.000. In the end allied forces 
were “annihilated” and Kavala, Drama and Niš were captured.48 
 
In the second grouping of Turkish historians, well-known Yılmaz Öztuna writes 
an Ottoman history in his fourteen volume work Büyük Türkiye Tarihi (“Great 
History of Turkey”) in detail. Before coming to Sırpsındığı Battle, he names 
other encounters of Ottomans with the Serbs. Firstly, Süleyman Pasha saves 
Salonika from falling into Serbian hands with his army of 20.000 men in 1349. 
This is the first physical encounter of the two armies. After this success, Orhan 
declined the “mighty” Serbian King Dušan’s proposal who wanted to form an 
alliance against the Byzantine Empire which led to the second battle. In the year 
1352 near Dimetoka and by the River Maritsa Süleyman Pasha again were 
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victorious against King Stefan Dušan and allied Bulgarians to save Edirne.49 
Öztuna refers specifically to this Serb-Bulgarian alliance as a Slavic flood to 
threaten the Byzantine Empire which completely endangers the future plans of 
Orhan Bey. On the other side, it is seen that Dušan was well aware of the 
Ottoman danger.  
 
To go into some details that Öztuna provides for the reader, when a Serbian 
danger identified by the reign of Stefan Dušan is mentioned, it is about a ruler 
who is respected in his realm, commanding an army of 80.000 and started to 
threaten Constantinople from his capital Skopje. He foresaw that the Ottomans 
will use even more control over the region in the future and wanted to keep 
Orhan Bey neutral against the Byzantine Empire by offering his daughter to one 
of Orhan’s sons. Öztuna repeatedly indicates that this would completely be 
against the Ottoman interests to “drive Byzantium into the hands of the Slavs” 
which could even cost Ottoman sovereignty in the region as well.50 Although 
there are three states that are seemingly balanced and in a political power 
struggle, in fact Ottomans and Serbian Kingdom had the great potential to rise 
while Byzantines were on a swift decline. Therefore Ottomans in the fourteenth 
century seems to be a state that stands against the “Slavic danger” with all 
political and military acts possible in Öztuna’s narrative. It is possible to observe 
this mentality in author’s concepts of danger and cooperation. However, this 
Serbian danger dissappeared with the sudden death of the King Dušan and his 
state was divided among the claimants. 
 
Furthermore in Öztuna’s history the two wars that were mentioned as 
controversial in historiography were definitely taken separately without any 
doubt brought to attention as some authors; such as Đsmail Hami Danişmend, 
preferred. In the “Victory of Sırpsındığı” (1364) the army consisted of Serbian, 
Bosnian, Hungarian and Vlahian soldiers, “provoked” by the Pope, were 
defeated by the force of 10.000 men commanded by Hacı Đlbey. Since the army 
of Murad I was in Bursa and Crusaders advanced quickly Edirne was in serious 
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danger. This is why Hacı Đlbey acted heroically and made a sudden night attack 
to either kill or push the enemy into the River Maritsa who was drunk and 
asleep.51 Öztuna, while not indicating the number of the coalition forces, uses 
the word victory in the title, names this coalition as a Crusade and underlines 
that this is a result of the Pope incitements. 
 
Regarding the Victory of Maritsa (Çirmen Zaferi) Öztuna writes that seven years 
after the Sırpsındığı, Europe tried her luck with a second crusade but this time 
with more Serbian soldiers involved. As the result, Serbian commander King 
Vukašin was killed and the Turks could advance deep into the Macedonian 
territories. Here too, he writes, the people were waiting for the Turks to install a 
new rule since the Serbian rule was even worse than the Byzantine rule.52 
Regarding the formation of the armies unlike any other historian Öztuna believes 
that the Pope called for a crusade against the advancing Turkish armies. 
However, Finkel thinks that formation of the Christian army that fought at the 
Battle of Maritsa was due to the will of the Orthodox landlords and their 
uneasiness with the Ottoman advancement, unlike the Pope who is the religious 
leader of the Catholic world. In the end the Battle of Çirmen that was fought on 
the Maritsa River constituted a disaster for the Serbian lords who caused the 
battle in the first place. Defeated Serbian lords and three rulers of Bulgaria 
became Ottoman vassals.53 
 
In order to make a comparison between the nationalist/right wing historians’ 
narratives and a scholarly written one, Metin Kunt writes about the battles of 
Sırpsındığı in 1364 and Çirmen in 1371 as separate ones as well. However what 
he is being critical is not the dates but the nature of these wars. For him these 
were successful battles of defense for the Ottomans against Balkan alliances, 
rather than offensive campaigns for the extermination of their Christian 
adversaries as all of the Turkish writers in question depicted. Actually in this 
period, according to Kunt, Ottoman power is not very stable and there is a 
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balance of powers in the region. It is only after 1380s that Ottomans feel more 
comfortable and are on the attacking side.54 
 
To sum up the chapter, Öztuna askes the question “who were to stop the Turks’ 
conquests in the Balkans?”. Since Murad I took cities like Edirne, Lüleburgaz, 
Çorlu, Malkara, Đpsala, Dimetoka, Plovdiv in twenty five years time Ottomans 
were on a speedy rise. As an answer he says that Byzantine Empire had already 
failed to stop them. Serbs and Bulgarians were not seeming as powerful as they 
were at the time of Orhan Bey. One possibility could be the Hungarians. 
However since they are Catholics and have been using pressure in order to force 
the Orthodox Christians to convert, they were not to be welcomed in the Serbian 
and Rumeli territories. Therefore the balance of powers he once mentioned was 
gone forever in favor of the Ottomans. Another factor that makes Ottoman 
conquests quick is the fact that people of the Balkans were hoping for a new 
regime in the region to give them the prosperous life they have been looking for. 
Turks were being expected as saviors and Orthodox Christians of the region 
could not be provoked by any other state to rebel against them.55 
 
In the conception that Öztuna offers to his readers regarding the Ottoman 
conquest in the Balkans there are two issues problematic and worth considering. 
Firstly; the very idea of provoking the people against an empire seems to be 
derived from the 19th century history, hence an anachronic approach could be 
visible here. Secondly; there is the idea of Hungarian provokation of the people 
of the Balkans before the conquest of these lands.56 That is to say, the anxiety 
about the Hungarian provokation, openness of the Balkan Christians to this 
provokation and tendency to rebel and their preference of playing a nationalistic 
game instead of fighting directly as a state against the Ottomans could be a result 
of the author’s amalgamation of the ideas of 19th century with the events of the 
fourteenth century. In terms of reproduction and recreation of the history, the 
author’s contemporary recognition of the events has a great influence. Thirdly; 
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Öztuna in his narrative completely ignores the existence of other socioethnic 
groups as actors within the Ottoman state. They are Turks that capturing cities, 
Turks that fight in the borderline as akindjis and succesful Turkish commanders 
that lead the armies. However, it is indicated by recent historians that right from 
the beginning Ottoman ruling class formed as a coalition of Muslims Turks and 
former Byzantine Christians or converts.57 People from a wide range of social 
groups were added into this coalition as the state turned into an empire, which 
will be argued in the coming chapters. 
 
Ziya Nur Aksun, widely read islamist/nationalist historian, specifically identifies 
the Ottoman conquest with the benefits for the Balkan Orthodox population as 
the establishment of Islamic rule. In order to achieve the advancement towards 
the north-west Murad I carried out well-planned and specific preparations.58 
Kunt and Aksun agree on the idea that Rumeli was not a land to plunder but a 
land to expand and settle.59 
 
Aksun futher explains Sırpsındığı Battle as the fight between the Ottomans and 
the  Crusaders prepared by the Orthodox ruling elite who started to lose their 
incomes. At the time, Christian Orthodox locals were living an unprecedented 
prosperous and comfortable life due to the fair Ottoman rule and here happy to 
the degree that would never think about an uprising against the Ottoman rule. 
This Crusader army of 60.000-100.000 soldiers were attacked by Hacı Đlbey’s 
10.000 soldiers while they were got drunk during the night. These infidels were 
killed and in that chaos some even did kill their own fellows.60 As a result, parts 
of Serbia and Bulgaria and the Raguza Republic entered Ottoman control. A 
special attention given to Raguza by Aksun in his narrative as he states that this 
tiny republic stayed under “our” control until 1829, had a very prosperous life 
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and it took only few years after the Ottoman retreat from Raguza to occur a 
decline in incomes and population.61 Regarding the issue, on the other hand, 
Kunt argues that they only paid a yearly tribute and never got under the Ottoman 
control.62 Apperently political thinking through the concept of rebellion and 
uprising is a could be perceived as a common theme among the Turkish 
historians who were deeply influenced by the loss of the Balkans in the 19th 
century and Aksun too supports this approach. It is also very visible that the 
author stresses the new Islamic rule’s tolerant and prosperous nature to provide 
much better conditions for the Orthodox people of the region unlike the 
contemporary Catholic or Orthodox ruling elites. 
 
 
2.1.3 Struggle in Anatolia - 1387 
 
After the defeats that allied armies led by Serbian commanders faced against the 
Ottoman forces considerable number of land lords turned into Ottoman vassals. 
Their vassaldom required them to send soldiers when needed. This is actually an 
interesting theme as the Ottomans started to use Christian soldiers for all kinds 
of military purposes, meaning towards the Christian west and Muslim east. It 
could be useful to bring the histories that indicated the usage of Christian 
soldiers especially against the Karamanoğlu principality in 1387 together.63 
 
In this regard Rıza Nur argues that Karamanoğlu principality declared war in an 
effort to take the advantage that Ottomans were occupied with the Rumeli 
region. Ottomans, including their vassal Serbian forces fought a bloody battle 
against the Karamanoğlu. He does not mention about an alliance between the 
Serbs and Karamanoğlu principality. He also suffices to write that Serbian 
soldiers were punished for being disobedient to orders without giving any further 
detail.64 
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Kunt indicates that Murad I with his vassal Byzantine, Serbian and Bulgarian 
forces marched to Konya where Alaaddin Ali of Karamanoğlu had claims over 
the Ottoman territories that were bought some time ago.65 Đnalcık instead names 
the allied forces as the Byzantines, Serbian despot and other Serbian lords, 
indicating a fragmented structure between the despot and lords in an unstable 
Serbia.66 
 
It is understood from the narrative of Danişmend that Lazar Grebliyanović was 
tied with duties of vassaldom to Ottomans in 1372 and with heavier conditions 
in 1375, yet he “has not given up on his Turkish enmity for a single second”.67 
Despite this Turkish enmity, interestingly, he collaborates with Karamanoğlu, 
according to Danişmend. The reason for the clash between two “compatriot 
armies” in Konya was given as the Lazar’s provocation which led to 
Karamanoğlu attack to a Hamidoğlu town that was recently bought by the 
Ottomans. In return, Murad I supported his army with his vassals from 
Byzantium, Serbia and Bulgaria and attacked to Konya.68 With this information, 
it is understood that Karamanoğlu collaborates with the Serbian king who 
actually an Ottoman vassal and they cause synchronically problems to Ottomans 
from each side of the border. Also Ottomans gather an army that has Serbian 
elements in it, who are likewise the vassals. With the nature of the alliances that 
were formed, fragmented structure of Serbian realms at the time could be 
observed. That is to say, it is somewhat arbitrary to ascribe nation-state 
specialties and clear-cut boundaries for the polities of the late fourteenth century 
where drastic changes in alliances could occur in short periods of time with the 
extremely fragmented political structures. 
 
Finally Danişmend mentions that due to the plunder that the Serbian soldiers did 
in Konya they were heavily punished by the Ottomans and some were executed. 
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This event is told to be the one of the reasons for Serbs to rebel and the famous 
Battle of Kosovo which will take place in 1389. 
 
It is a fact that Murad’s rapid conquests in the north-west led to subordination of 
the Byzantine Palaiologos princes and many Serbian lords. Ottomans showed 
little hesitation to utilize the soldiers that came from Christian realms against the 
Anatolian Turcoman principalities. However it could be guessed that both within 
and out of the Ottoman society there was a shared discontent with the situation. 
According to Vatin, as an answer to the issue of execution and punishment of the 
Serbian soldiers in Konya, Murad first made Alaaddin Bey subordinated and 
then let him continue to stay and rule in his territories. This act while causing 
alleviation among the Muslim Anatolian population and elites, on the other hand 
deprived the Serbian soldiers from an expected booty and reward. As a result 
frustrated Serbian soldiers plundered the civil population in Konya. Vatin takes 
the severe punishments of Murad I towards the Serbian soldiers as a reason for 
hatred against the Ottoman rule and catalyst for the Battle of Kosovo.69 
 
Not only about the struggle between the Ottomans and Karamanoğulları, but 
almost on every subject that relates to the Serbs, Nicolas Vatin is the historian 
with most details and explanations. He clearly indicates that in the 1380s the 
usage of Christian soldiers derived from mostly Serbian vassals against the Turk 
and Muslim armies and principalities were not approved by the Ottoman society 
and probably by some of the ruling elite. Thus, there is very little information 
and detail in the Turkish sources regarding this issue.70 
 
This is actually a significant theme that most of the Turkish authors ignored in 
their histories. The reasons for this kind of attitude may vary. Most probably 
they either did not consider this fact to be plausible, or were unwilling to include 
it into historical narrative, which would violate Islamic or nationalistic 
sensibilities.   
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Besides the ones that have been mentioned, there are several other issues that 
require critical attention with regards to Turkish historians’ approach. For 
instance it could be observed that one nationalist author, Yılmaz Öztuna and 
another Islamist Ziya Nur Aksun repeatedly stress that the idea of Slavic 
solidarity is one of the most significant problem that Ottomans faced during the 
late fourteenth century. It seems to be a reflex rather than an analysis for the 
right wing historians to ascribe Slavic solidarity a decisive role in the politics at 
such an early this period whose mindsets were haunted by the terrible legacy of 
the 19th century Panislavism. 
 
Another issue to be pointed out is the political structure of Serbia that is depicted 
through the history books for the reader. Finkel describes the Serbia between the 
years 1350 and 1400 as a time of vassals and petty ruler.71 This approach is both 
useful to explain the power vacuum in the post-Dušan period specifically and 
also, in general terms, suitable with the zeitgeist as the middle ages symbolizes a 
fragmented political structure in many parts of Europe. Turkish historians on the 
other hand introduce the strongest lord as the despot, prince or the ruler of whole 
Serbia to their readers. This might be a result of a very dominant unitary state 
perception of contemporary Turkey which could easily misled the authors as a 
paradigm to miss to grasp the nature of the feudal struggle between the lords 
without a central authority in modern sense.  
 
There is a shared understanding and agreement in Ottoman defeat and heavy 
losses in Pločnik in 1388 by mainly Serbian forces among the historians from all 
the traditions. This is also regarded as the reason for Murad I to prepare a 
decisive campaign towards the Serbian land which will lead to famous Battle of 
Kosovo of 1389. 
 
2.2. Enemies to Allies: Battles of Kosovo (1389) and Ankara (1402) 
 
In the aftermath of the Battle of Kosovo an empire and a rule over the Balkan 
vassal lords was established. However, it was still true that these lords were 
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ready to take any opportunity to fight back.72 It will only be possible to 
completely impose sovereignty in the region during the time of Mehmed II who 
would destroy these little dynasties to connect the Rumeli directly to Dersaadet.  
 
The process of gradual integration of the Balkan lands to the Ottoman center 
mainly took place as a result of the battles that were fought by the Ottoman army 
in the fourteenth century as many historians that are in our scope explain. 
Stefanos Yerasimos on the other hand provides his readers a broader, more 
economy based and conceptual idea of how the transformation in the Balkans 
occurred, surely with a leftist perception. The situation before the Ottomans was 
explained as a struggle between a feudal ruling class that has the tendency to 
collaborate with the Catholic West and the people who were being oppressed in 
order to make them serfs. Although this struggle was an Orthodox-Catholic 
clash in the eyes of the people, the true nature of the fight for the Balkans was to 
determine the productive activities. Furthermore, in terms of the Ottoman 
mentality the Balkans provided supply of grains with the endless fertile valleys 
and silver with the Novo Brdo silver mines in Serbia.73 In this case the 
conqueror Ottoman Empire’s interests seem to be in line with the Bulgarians, 
Serbs and other people of the region. That is to say that Yerasimos explains the 
story not mainly with Ottoman military successes or Islamic tolerance but rather 
with economical structures and determinism. 
 
 
2.2.1. The Battle of Kosovo 
 
The Battle of Kosovo in 1389 is widely thought as the decisive moment for all 
the Ottoman, Balkan and Serbian histories that were written in modern times. 
The Battle of Kosovo’s correspondence with the nationalistic images, themes 
and ideas brought about a rich historical narrative composed around it. Killing of 
sultan Murad I, King Lazar, Miloš are all very intriguing events that were taken 
up by the historians. It is interesting to observe the language and the discourse 
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picked by the historians from all ideological backgrounds. Maybe no other event 
in the early period of Ottoman history could give more ideas about the 
historiography and the historians. This battle, of which every historian has many 
things to say, gives tools for comparison and could be used as a litmus paper for 
the republican era historiography of Turkey. 
 
Đsmail Hami Danişmend in this regard, is a historian that highlights the 
nationalistic elements both on Ottoman and Serbian sides. Surely the whole 
historical and literary legacy behind this battle helps making the event inevitably 
look as a significant national moment in the history. But also with the author’s 
choice, the selection of words and depiction of the events indicate that it is not 
mere written in terms of a history of two armies’ clash, but rather as a heroic 
narrative full of excitement and feelings. First of all, in Danişmend’s history it 
could be understood that the term Serbia refers to the land that encompasses 
modern day Serbia, Kosovo and northern Macedonia, ruled by the Serbian king 
and his voivodes. Yet it is unknown whether this is his idea or a borrowed 
concept from the western sources. The main reason for Serbian led allied forces 
to lose the battle was given as the betrayal and retreat of the Voivode of Kosovo 
and son-in-law of the King Lazar, Vuk Brankovic in Danişmend’s history. 
Prince Bayezid’s successful maneuvers in the field and this betrayal brought 
about the result of the battle. In Danişmend’s words:  
 
“under these circumstances were the allies unable to resist any longer 
and began to flee in a chaotic way; while these lost their lives through 
Turkish sword, was the general commander of the allied forces and 
Serbian King Lazar Grebliyanović taken prisoner together with his 
entourage, consisting of his lords, as well as his military unit 
consisting of one thousand soldiers.”  
 
This is the depiction of the battle field’s situation for the Serbs. The fate of King 
Lazar also gains much attention from the author. He provides all three possible 
endings for his story. He was either executed in front of Sultan Murad as a rebel 
who actually should have acted as his loyal vassal, or his head was cut by prince 
Bayezid during the battle, or saved himself by offering his sister to Bayezid. 
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However the last one, according to Danişmend cannot be true since it is certain 
that he did not survive the Battle of Kosovo.74  
 
Furthermore, the Victory of Kosovo caused the death of the victorious Turkish 
ruler as well. There are various accounts regarding his death. Danişmend mainly 
considers two possibilities: either during or after the battle by a Serbian hero 
with a poisonous dagger who pretended to convert to Islam and kiss the foot of 
the “great Turkish soldier”. 75 
 
In the aftermath of the Kosovo Battle, the new sultan Bayezid showed a great 
political ability and mature attitude, argues Danişmend. Instead of crushing the 
whole Serbia, he calmly tied the princes himself as vassals who would loyally 
fight alongside him in Bosnia, Nicopolis and Ankara. With the same 
arrangement Bayezid married Olivera Despina, the princess of Serbia.76 
Although on the one hand Danişmend believes that Serbian loyalty was 
significant and beneficial especially in the military support, on the other hand he 
blames “this Serbian girl’s entrance to the Ottoman palace, meant the entrance of 
alcohol and debauchery as well” which turned out to be a great disaster and the 
start of foreign (“ecnebi”) influence in the palace.77 
 
Another author that could be evaluated as extreme right is Rıza Nur. He writes 
that the Battle of Kosovo actually started as a rebellion which was led by the 
Serbs in the whole Balkans. Sultan Murad’s army was joined by Sadrazam 
(“grand vizier”) Çınarlızade Ali Pasha’s forces and marched towards the army 
that represented the whole Balkans. It is important to note that this “crusader” 
“enemy” army consisted of 100.000 soldiers from Serbia, Hungary, Wallachia 
and Bosnia, “representing the whole Balkans”, positioned itself to best possible 
location in the Kosovo plain while “ours” had 40.000 soldiers and were in an 
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unfavorable geographical position. However against all the odds Ottoman army 
“ruined the enemy in a complete way.”78 While King Lazar was killed, a 
wounded Serb, Miloš Kobilovič, approached to Sultan by basically telling him 
the famous lie and killed him. Rıza Nur interestingly concludes “the sultan was 
buried and mausoleum erected at the site. It is still present and in the hands of 
the Serbs. C’est la vie!”79 
 
This “rebellious Serbs against the Turks” theme continuously appears at almost 
all phases of Ottoman-Serbian history in the nationalistic historiography. How 
come such a happy society with the Ottoman rule could be provoked or led to 
rebellion so easily is a question that should have been addressed by the authors 
of these books. The answer for this question might be in the 19th century history 
that witnessed the falling apart of the “Sublime State” (Devlet-i Aliyye) in which 
Serbs were the first nation to be provoked and rebelled. It is assumed that there 
is a direct continuity between the Serbian society in the fourteenth century and 
the nineteenth century. It is a journey from a happy and prosperous society to an 
ungrateful and rebellious population where Turks became the real victims of the 
events. 
 
Furthermore, from the narrative of Yılmaz Öztuna interesting points could be 
found regarding the “First Kosovo Victory”. Unlike Rıza Nur, he indicates the 
disastrous Pločnik Battle that costed 20.000 martyrs to the Ottomans against a 
crusader army in 1388 as the main cause for the preparations of a great battle in 
the Balkans for both sides; one is determined to expel the Turks, the other to 
establish stability for herself in the region. Allied forces were from Hungary, 
Poland, Serbia, Kingdom of Bosnia, Wallachia, Croatia, Bohemia, Albania and 
Bulgaria. In addition, it is stated as any other Turkish author that the crusader 
army had much more soldiers compared to forces of Murad I. Before the 
explanation of the battle, Öztuna includes one interesting issue to his history. He 
says “as the Serbian sources also confess, while the Turkish army moved 
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forward, it did not do the slightest damage [to the civilians].” Although he does 
not say what exactly the source is, it is significant that the confession of Turks’ 
righteous attitude comes from the Serbian side which could be thought as a 
detail to point out who the enemy was in this battle.80 
 
 After eight hours of battle Turks completely destroyed the allied forces and put 
them to the sword, including the commander Lazar. This, being one of the 
greatest battles of the middle ages, however, led to martyrdom of Sultan Murad. 
He was killed by the son-in-law of Lazar, Miloš, with a dagger by stabbing his 
heard. Though there are many versions of the killing of the sultan in 1389, this 
version is the one that could be embraced by the average reader more excitedly 
where the protagonist is a Serbian noble to represent the Serbian people to some 
extent, and the wound opened in sultan’s heart to martyr him. Surely, Miloš was 
cut into pieces by the Turks.81  
 
The last nationalist historian to be mentioned, Zuhuri Danışman, writes about the 
Battle of Kosovo in detail and even with dialogues that he borrows from the 
sixteenth century Ottoman historian Neşri. He defines the allied forces with 
Serbian, Wallachian, Bosnian, Albanian and few Hungarian and Polish soldiers 
commanded by the Serbian king. A dialogue between Sultan Murad and the 
shameless Serbian envoy in Danışman’s narrative is an interesting one: 
- Envoy: Why you are so late? We have been waiting for you for three 
months. 
- Murad I: You should be replied by the sword but “envoys have to be 
spared” (“elçiye zeval olmaz”). You will see what will happen in the 
battlefield... 
After taking a walk among the Ottoman army the envoy continued 
being impertinent: 
- You showed me your army but our king’s army is three times larger 
than this. Especially the armored cavalry unit of 15.000 could alone 
destroy your whole army.82 
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This attitude enraged the sultan. He expelled the envoy and gathered his war 
council in accordance with the Islamic tradition and Sunna (deeds of the prophet 
Muhammad). It is only in Danışman’s narrative that Murad I looked anxious. He 
recites the Qur’an the whole night and commanders consulted the practice of 
bibliomancy from the Qur’an, all refer to importance of Islamic practices among 
the Sultan and high commanders and strong belief to fate. It is even told that 
Murad prayed, asking “provide the army victory and take my life” to God. In 
contrast to the calm and devoted nature of the Ottoman headquarters, there was 
confusion and discord among the enemy lines in the morning. The main issue 
that the commanders discussed was whether or not to attack at night. Since they 
were sure about the victory they eventually thought that in case of a night attack 
the Ottoman army could escape them and be saved from total demolition. 
Therefore they decided to wait until the morning.83 
 
Danışman incorporates traditions from various sources. These historical 
accounts differ from one another on this issue but it is commonly indicated that 
allied forces were larger in number compared to the Ottoman army. Danışman 
believes the anxiety of Murad prior to the battle is a strong proof for this 
situation and he concludes that allied forces should be more than 100.000 and 
Ottoman army less than 60.000.84 Besides the similar killing stories of Serbian 
King Lazar Grebliyanović and Sultan Murad he also importantly adds that, with 
the Serbian sources’ witnessing, Miloš did not kill the sultan out of nationalistic 
feeling but to clear himself out of a personal issue.85 
 
It is already underlined that Yerasimos brought the economical and ideological 
aspects of the Ottoman expansion in the Balkans. On the other hand, Zuhuri 
Danışman offers a three-sided explanation. The disciplined Ottoman army is the 
first reason for rapid Ottoman expansion in the Balkans, he claims. The 
Janissaries were significant but the most important unit was the Turkish timarlis 
according to Danışman. Secondly “the Ottoman rule and policies were found 
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very humanistic by the Orthodox Balkan people who had to make a choice 
between the Hungarian oppression and Turkish justice”. By stating this, 
Danışman argues that there was a voluntary aspect in conquests. The quotation 
he borrows from Gibbons to strengthen his argument is “It must not be forgotten 
that every single nation in the Balkans preferred Ottoman sovereignty over their 
neighbors’ and the single point that these conflicting states agreed upon was the 
fact that Ottoman rule was way better that those of Hungarians and Italians.” 
Finally the anarchic post-Dušan politics in the region and the struggle among the 
Serbian lords for power proved very useful for Ottomans to advance.86 
 
Very similar to what Danişmend wrote, the unexpected move by the new sultan 
to connect Serbia tightly to Istanbul as a vassal state, instead of crushing her to 
ground is valid in Öztuna and Danışman as well.87 This way, all three historians 
agree that a thankful (“minnettar”) Serbia would be much more useful especially 
in the inevitable struggle against the Hungarians. It is not mentioned anywhere at 
this point that Serbian soldiers were used mainly against the Turcoman 
principalities in Anatolia instead against the Hungarians. 
 
From the Islamist point of view, Ziya Nur Aksun’s depiction of the Kosovo 
Battle is worth considering. Similar to what Danışman derived from the various 
accounts, Aksun as well believes that the Ottoman army of 60.000 fought 
against 100.000 allied enemy forces.88 As the result, “enemy was utterly 
destroyed” and the Sultan who asked for victory and martyrdom from God was 
killed by Miloš. Regarding Miloš, Aksun goes into detail and explains that 
Miloš, although a folkloric hero in Serbia today and has statues around the 
country, did not decided to kill the sultan due to his patriotic feelings but 
because of “his aim to prevent an accusation related to a woman issue.”89 
Finally, on the battle, he writes that Bayezid concluded it in the absence of his 
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father and forced the Serbian king to a peace deal to render Serbia a vassal state. 
Unlike any other historian, Aksun does not mention the killing of Lazar and also 
writes that he –as the king- made peace with Bayezid the Thunderbolt.90 
 
As this war sealed the fate of the Balkan nations, according to Aksun, the battle 
field is signified by being the “Place of Martyrdom of the Sultan” (Meşhed-i 
Hüdavendigar) which is the “symbol of our sovereignty in the Balkans”.91 As 
Murad I gave freedom (“serbestlik”) to all Balkan Christians, the Ottoman rule 
was preferred to any other rule by the Balkan nations. Interestingly, Ziya Nur 
Aksun connects history with the present day as he states that “at present, in face 
of the political practices which do not acknowledge freedom of conscience, 
human rights and justice, [the tomb of Sultan Murad] constitutes a banner of 
these ideals.”92 On this narrative two issues are worth underlining. One is his 
frequent usage of “the Balkan nations (Balkan kavimleri)”, where the term 
nation is used. What is known today as “imagined communities” is projected to 
the medieval past. Also, his obvious reference to Serbia under the government of 
Slobodan Miloševic is striking, when he uses the phrase “political practices 
which do not acknowledge freedom of conscience, human rights and justice.” 
 
 
2.2.2. Struggle in Anatolia: 1390 
 
Once the Balkans was safer than ever for the Ottomans in the aftermath of the 
Battle of Kosovo, they turned their attention to Anatolia. From the general 
outline of the many histories that were written in the Turkish Republic, it could 
be claimed that Bayezid’s intentions were clear to complete a political unity in 
Anatolia by bringing the principalities under Ottoman control. In order to 
achieve this goal he made several attempts towards the eastern frontier.  
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Finkel and Vatin agree on the fact that the Ottoman military campaigns on the 
Turcoman principalities during the Bayezid’s reign were supported significantly 
by his vassals.93 That is to say, while Kadı Burhaneddin, Saruhanoğlu, 
Germiyanoğlu, Menteşeoğlu and Hamidoğlu principalities gathered around 
Karamanoğulları, Bayezid the Thunderbolt brought military support from 
Stephen and Lazarević of Serbia and Manuel II Palaiologos of Byzantine 
Empire. 
 
Surely, the usage of Christian soldiers against the Turcoman and Muslim 
Anatolian principalities is a controversial topic in the early Ottoman history. 
Among the republican period historians that were surveyed three basic 
inclinations could be observed. 
 
Firstly, Zuhuri Danışman and Đsmail Hami Danişmend writes about the Serbian 
soldiers in some detail only enough to enable the reader to have an idea 
regarding their existence during the Anatolian campaign of Bayezid I in 1390.94 
However, there are interesting issues that could be highlighted in these two 
narratives. Danışman, for instance, stresses the fact that during the occupation of 
Karaman in 1397 only Turkish soldiers were used on both parties since “... this 
struggle was between two rulers who made claims over the legacy of the 
Seljukids and aimed at establishing hegemony over Anatolia.”95 Also 
Danişmend asserts that Bayezid the Thunderbolt undertook these campaigns 
because he wanted to establish “national and political union of the fatherland.”96  
 
Secondly, Öztuna mentions about the presence of Serbian and Byzantine soldiers 
so slightly that only a careful and questioning reader could realize its real 
essence. Öztuna suffices to say that while Ottoman army was advancing towards 
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the western Anatolia there were few Serbian soldiers.97 He also argues that Kadı 
Burhaneddin was a cruel man, the Karamanids were meant to be deprived from 
Seljuk legacy due to their shallow policies and the people of central Anatolia 
strongly desired Ottoman rule.98 This approach is a rather apologetic and 
legitimizing one. It should not be a coincidence that legitimization of war against 
the Muslim principalities and ignoring the fact of the usage of the Christian 
soldiers came altogether in the same chapter in Öztuna’s narrative. 
 
Thirdly, and most problematically, Ziya Nur Aksun completely denies the 
existence of the usage of Christian soldiers in Anatolia. He writes that cities like 
Akşehir, Niğde and Akhisar opened their gates to Ottoman army due to the just 
rule of the Ottomans by ignoring completely about the Serbian and Byzantine 
vassals’ inclusion to campaign completely.99 
 
 
2.2.3. The Battle of Ankara 
 
The Battle of Ankara against Tamerlane that took place in 1402 turned out to be 
a disastrous one for the Ottomans. Surely among many other aspects that could 
be discussed, the focus here will be on the Serbs and their situation during the 
battle. Furthermore, one significant Serbian character in this chapter of the 
Ottoman history as being wife to Bayezid I is Olivera Despina. However, the 
things written regarding the personalities of Olivera and Bayezid I will be dealt 
with in the chapter III. 
 
In terms of the overall stance of the popular Turkish historians that wrote about 
the Battle of Ankara, a three-fold grouping could be made. According to the first 
group, there were Serbian soldiers in the Ottoman army during the battle; 
however they were not useful as they deserted the battlefield, leaving Ottomans 
in the dire situation. Second group argues that, there were surely Serbian soldiers 
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in the army and what they have done during and after the battle were of great 
importance. It has to be also added that this theme of usefulness is valid for the 
narratives of modern historians, such as; Caroline Finkel100 and Nicolas Vatin101. 
The third stance, finally, is the exclusion of the Serbs as an actor in the Battle of 
Ankara completely. 
 
Đsmail Hami Danişmend writes that the defeat in the Çubuk plain near Ankara 
was a great national disaster. Danışman explains that Serbian King Stefan’s 
forces were part of the Ottoman army which made up to 100.000 soldiers against 
an enemy of 300.000. Serbs, however, escaped once they understood that no 
chances of survival left for the Ottoman army.102 Rıza Nur, in this regard, shortly 
writes that 8000 Serbian soldiers as well as King Stefan were present in the 
Ottoman army of 100.000 soldiers. While he uses the terms Ottoman army and 
Turkish army interchangeably in this context, it is unclear what Serbian soldiers 
did during and after the war.103 Öztuna, similarly, states that between ten and 
twenty thousand Serbian soldiers were located in the left wing of the Ottoman 
army and were controlled by the brother-in-law of Bayezid I. He further argues 
that when the things started to get bad for the Ottomans and some losses 
occurred from the Serbian forces, Serbian army retreated without any 
consideration about the rest of the army.104 There is an interesting point here 
regarding the slight shift in stance of Öztuna over time. While in his Büyük 
Türkiye Tarihi (“Great History of Turkey”) that was printed in late 1970’s there 
is a negativitiy ascribed to the Serbian force in the Ottoman army in the Battle of 
Ankara, his earlier work on the issue, a monograph that was printed in 1946, 
claims otherwise. Öztuna argues that the 10-20 thousand soldiers that were 
commanded by Serbian King Petro Stefan Lazarević constituted a vigorous 
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armoured force in the Ottoman forces and were extremely helpful.105 Adding 
that Öztuna uses much more references and footnotes in his earlier work, it 
seems to be more sensitive about historical methodology and a possible reason 
for his shift in the attitude regarding the Serbian forces, without any indication 
of source, could be explained with a more nationalist approach to the history. 
 
Secondly, Zuhuri Danışman is the author that writes openly about the existence 
and the good work done by the Serbian soldiers in the Battle of Ankara. 
According to Danışman, there were ten or twenty thousand Serbian soldiers in 
the Ottoman army that consisted totally of thirty or sixty thousand soldiers, 
which increases the percentage to around %30 compared to %10 that was given 
by the authors in the first group.106 From the general outlook of Danışman’s 
narrative, it is understood that Serbs in the Ottoman army both consisted a 
significant portion and fought well. Likewise the general situation, regarding the 
Serbs in the Ottoman Empire is quite positive in Danışman’s narrative and he 
does not blame Olivera for spoiling Bayezid I and leading to misadministration 
of the empire and controlling the army in the battlefield.107 As mentioned, while 
Finkel agrees with this approach, Vatin goes one step further and ascribes a very 
critical role to the Serbs. Regarding the Battle of Ankara, he states “Only 
Serbian forces were standing. Since Bayezid I declined to retreat while he was 
protected with a unit of Janissaries, Stefan Lazarević, desperately, had to pull 
back and tried to provide the safety of prince Suleyman”. According to Vatin 
this was an attitude to keep the state standing and alive in the midst of a terrible 
defeat.108 
 
Finally, the narrative of Ziya Nur Aksun is the one that ignores the Serbian 
existence in the Ottoman army. Both in Osmanlı Tarihi109 and Đslam Tarihi110 
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books there is neither a mention regarding the Serbs in the Ottoman army during 
the Battle of Ankara nor any references to relationship of Bayezid I with Stefan 
Lazarević. 
 
To sum up, it appears that it is highly unlikely to deduce reliable information 
regarding one of the most significant times that Serbs were active in the Ottoman 
history in a very explicit manner. Their existence either completely ignored or 
downplayed by the popular historians. It is also interesting to observe that while 
the historians that underlined the Serbian escape from the battlefield, such as; 
Yılmaz Öztuna and Đsmail Hami Danişmend, on one hand writes along the 
national terms and do not incorporate the non-Turkic or non-Muslim elements of 
the Empire to the Ottoman society and administrative elite properly, on the other 
hand they could expect a complete loyalty, more than the Turkish soldiers offer, 
to the sultan, hence describing the Serbian retreat in the Battle of Ankara as a 
betrayal. 
2.3. Until Serbia Becomes History 
 
2.3.1. The Last Phase of the Ottoman Interregnum: 1412-13 
 
The following years of the disastrous Ankara Battle were defined by the 
struggles for the throne among the princes Mehmed, Süleyman and Musa in the 
Ottoman realms. As Finkel argues, especially in the final phase of these 
struggles, the Serbian despot Stephen Lazarević and his soldiers were very 
influential in determining the outcome.111 During the decisive battle in 1413 
between Mehmed and Musa, just like Serbian army, Byzantine Emperor Manuel 
and Dulkadiroğlu forces too fought alongside Mehmed of whom they thought as 
the weaker one.112 Similar to what Orhan once did, by supporting the weaker 
candidate to throne, now it is their turn to balance the power struggle not to let 
the strong to become even stronger. 
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Among the researched histories of the Turkish historians, it is possible to find 
traces of the aid provided by Byzantines and Serbs only in two: Đsmail Hami 
Danişmend’s Đzahlı Osmanlı Tarihi Kronolojisi and Zuhuri Danışman’s Osmanlı 
Đmparatorluğu Tarihi. Danişmend mentions both the Serbian support in 1410 to 
Musa Çelebi for the capture of Edirne and their change-of-sides in 1413 to help 
Mehmed to defeat Musa.113 
 
Danışman provides a little more detail than Danişmend. In 1410 Stefan 
Lazarević’s forces fought first against Süleyman and then for Süleyman against 
Musa. Although Musa lost the battle by the Eyüp walls, he took revenge by 
catching and killing disloyal Vuk Lazarević, the despot’s brother. In Danışman’s 
narrative it was shown very clearly that the Serbian soldiers’ help was decisive 
and significant. He even mentions that during the battle in 1413, left wing of 
Mehmed’s army consisted completely of Serbs.114 Except for these two 
historians, this important detail to end the Ottoman interregnum does not find 
itself a place in the narratives. 
 
 
2.3.2. The Sheik Bedreddin Rebellion - 1416 
 
The early years of the Mehmed I were still turbulent times for the Ottoman lands 
and understandably many authors refer him as the second founder of the empire. 
One very significant issue of Mehmed’s reign surely was Şeyh Bedreddin 
Rebellion. Although all of the historians mention the educational background of 
the Şeyh, his expanding influence among the unhappy peasants, the phases of 
the rebellion and somewhat socialist nature of Şeyh Bedrettin’s thoughts (surely 
the famous “to share everything except for wives” [“yarin yanağından gayrı”] 
verse) there is not much information to be deduced regarding the situation in the 
Balkans and the peasants of the region. 
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However, there is one writer/poet that provides limited socio-economic history 
in his beautifully written piece. Nazım Hikmet mentions about the situation in 
the Rumelia provinces of the Ottoman Empire and this part of the Rumelia 
region, where followers of Bedreddin gathered, is called Deliorman and also 
known as “ağaç denizi” (the sea of trees). Today the place is between the cities 
of Razgrad and Kubrat, Bulgaria. 
 
Nazım Hikmet claims that peasantry supported Bedreddin’s movement and he 
asserts that remnants of its effects are still visible in the 1910’s, right before the 
Balkan Wars. This influence could be seen in the region as the villagers of 
Rumelia are the most stubborn and tax evading people in the world.115 Nazım’s 
historical poem implies a former presence of an oppressive tax-collecting 
notable class. Therefore, in contrast to all other right-wing authors, Nazım’s 
poetic voice rejects the notion of an all-happy Balkan people under Ottoman 
administration. 
 
However, Vatin considers Nazım Hikmet’s romantic poetry as ahistorical and 
regards his view on the past as belonging to the field of the history of literature 
of the early Republican era. He does not believe that Şeyh Bedreddin’s ideas 
were mainly about communism. He argues that Bedreddin’s ideas were rather 
reproduced and instrumentalised by the authors of the republican era. Because, 
he thinks, there is so little data about Bedrettin’s political ideas.116 
 
 
2.3.3. The Reign of Murad II 
 
After the Battle of Ankara the established vassaldom suzerainty of the Ottoman 
Empire over Stefan Lazarević was changed naturally since vassaldom is a 
phenomenon that is defined within certain power relations. As was seen during 
the Ottoman interregnum, the idea of loyalty to the Sultan was gone and loyalty 
to self-interests principle gained validity for Serbia. It might even be claimed 
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that during the interregnum Byzantine Empire and especially Serbia considered 
Ottoman state only as first among the equals. This was the first significant 
change in the nature of the relations between Ottomans and Serbs. The second 
change and divergence occurred following the death of Stefan Lazarević in 
1427, which completed the rupture from the established relations of Bayezid’s 
time. 
 
Finkel summarizes the events during the rule of Murad II as follows: “The 
uncertain allegiance of Serbia provoked Ottoman attacks in the mid-1430s and 
the vassaldom of Serbia to the Ottomans rather than to Hungary was formalized 
through the Serbian despot George Brankovic’s payment of tribute and the 
marriage of his daughter Mara to Murad.”117 Surely the events of 1427 and 1448 
attracted much attention among the Turkish historians. Looking into the details 
and comments that they provided, the nature of the relations and Serbia’s 
situation in the first second quarter of the fifteenth century will be seen. 
 
Öztuna states what he would conclude in the end, already in the beginning, he, 
first analyses and judges, and then gives the relevant historical information. 
During the reign of Murad II, Serbia accepted to pay a yearly tribute and send 
soldiers on request but “they were not sincere about their commitment to 
Turkey. “They had succumbed to Turkish might but were still dreaming of 
independence” (“Türk kuvveti karşısında baş eğmişlerdi ve istiklal hülyasında 
idiler.”). Following their trials to form a secret alliance with the Hungarians in 
1433, Vizier Sarıca Pasha went to Semendire to call account from the despot. 
“The despot, who was extremely frightened, gave his oath of loyalty to the 
Turkish Khagan. He also promised to establish no relationship with Hungary. 
His daughter Mara, who was known for her beauty and from her mother’s side 
related to the Komnenos dynasty of Trabzon, was engaged to Murad II.”118 
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Zuhuri Danışman, too, thinks in the same lines with Öztuna in this regard. In this 
insincere friendship, Mara becomes the insurance policy that Branković gives 
away to save Serbia. Although he could once promised but did not send his 
daughter due to her young age, once the news of strengthened walls of 
Semendire reached Adrianople he had no choice but to let her be taken by one of 
Murad’s commander’s harem. This could barely save Branković from the 
sultan’s rage.119 Zuhuri Danışman further explains that relations between Murad 
and Brankoviç did not go well afterwards and Semendire was taken after three 
months of siege in August 1439. 
 
2.3.4. Annexation of Serbia: 1454-59 
 
The process of annexation of Serbia begins with the rule of Mehmed II, whom 
campaigns were commenced to remove Hungarian presence and influence in 
Serbia (1454-55). In 1456 Belgrade was besieged. Finally, in 1459, the capital 
city of Smederevo was conquered and Serbia as a political entity became 
terminated. Although the issue of annexation has been dealt mainly within the 
context of Ottoman – Hungarian struggle for supremacy in the region according 
to the Turkish popular historiography, right before the annexation the problem of 
succession in Serbian lands among various claimants taken up as the main 
catalyst that led to final Ottoman move. 
 
The theme of ‘Ottoman tolerance’ especially on the basis of religious freedom 
compared to Hungarian oppression has to be underlined once more in the 
context of these campaigns and annexation of Serbia, as historians, such as; 
Đsmail Hami Danişmend and Ziya Nur Aksun, give the example of Mehmed II as 
a just and tolerant ruler that won the hearts of the Serbs. For instance, 
Danişmend highlights the permission of Mehmed II for the construction of an 
Orthodox church next to each mosque in the region.120 
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Following the death of the Serbian King Brankovic in 1456121, his son Lazar 
succeeded. However; he died too after ruling only for two months and these 
sudden deaths of two rulers caused a crisis of succession in Serbia.122 Claimants 
to rule in Serbia who were mentioned in Danişmend’s narrative are two sons of 
Brankovic that were still alive (brothers of Lazar); their sister princess Mara who 
was married to Murad II and therefore was called ‘Tzaritza’ (“Çariçe Mara”), 
Lazar’s widowed wife Eleni and Lazar’s son-in-law the Bosnian King. However, 
says Danişmend, “Mehmed the Conqueror is the strongest claimant” as the 
Ottomans had established family ties with Serbian dynasty twice by marriage.123 
The claim of Mehmed II over his step-mother Mara and support of some Serbian 
nobles to him as a tolerant ruler against the oppressive Catholic influence on 
Serbia put weight to Ottoman claims in Serbia.124 Finkel, in this regard, concurs 
with the idea of the Serbian nobles’ favoring the Ottoman rule in contrast to 
Hungarians.125 
 
Öztuna, in this regard, argues, without touching to the issue of various claimants, 
that the death of Brankovic and Hungarian oppression paved the way for the 
annexation of Serbia whose rulers actually have been tricking the Ottomans by 
collaborating with the Hungarians for years.126 Regarding the annexation, 
Öztuna writes that “The Conqueror’s ending of Serbia in 1459 and connecting 
the country, as a simple vilayet (province) [...], to Rumeli Beylerbeyliği 
(“Governorship of Rumelia”) not only annihilated the idea of Serbia for ages, 
but also indicated the end for Bosnia.”127 This approach could be regarded as the 
final phase of a discourse that was started as somehow equal at the time of 
Orhan and continued as the superior for more than a hundred years. Kingdom of 
Serbia became a simple ‘vilayet’ –not even an ‘eyalet’- and its name was erased 
from the face of the earth for ages. 
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Furthermore, it is understood by now that Ziya Nur Aksun could omit the issues 
regarding the Serbs in his narrative. This case is true for the campaigns of 
Mehmed II to Serbia and her annexation as well. In his Đslam Tarihi (“The 
History of Islam”) there is no single reference to Serbia, her annexation and 
devshirme pashas of Serbian origin in the chapter that he dedicated to Mehmed 
II.128 Aksun writes very limitedly regarding the annexation of Serbia in his 
Osmanlı Tarihi (“The Ottoman History”). According to Aksun, Serbian people 
were saved from the yoke of the Catholics and anarchy and “tasted an 
unprecedented just rule” with the annexation.129  
 
Another issue, i.e. the devshirme pashas of Serbian origin, has been related in a 
more detailed way by popular historiography, especially while discussing the 
reign of Mehmed II. This topic will be dealt in Chapter III. 
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CHAPTER 3 
REEMERGE	CE OF SERBIA 
 
Although economic inefficiency and misrule was an empire-wide phenomenon 
in the 18th century, particularly the Balkans populations of the empire felt the 
decline of the military and land regime most. In addition to excessive taxation in 
order to supply a wartime economy, misuses and acts of oppression by the 
Janissaries caused a common distrust and complaint in the region. This 
explanation surely depicts a very economical aspect of the rebellions. In addition 
to the economical discontent the ideas that were spread by the French 
Revolution of 1789 made a great impact on the populations of the empires 
throughout the 19th century. 
 
Particularly regarding the Serbian case, today many historians believe that it 
very doubtful that there was a commonly shared nationalistic feeling and 
willingness to fight in the name of the Serbian nation when the uprising of 1804 
broke out in Belgrade and it was a peasant rebellion.130 Although this idea 
implies that there was neither a well defined Serbian territory nor a 
consciousness of nationality in the modern sense, people at least exactly knew 
that they were different and distinct from the ruling elite of the empire and some 
of the neighboring populations through the differences in language and belief. 
Main resource of this consciousness occurred due to the existence of the Serbian 
Orthodox Church that lived until 1766. The church had been a cohesive factor 
for the Serbian community where societal life was rooted. The fact that services 
and education in the church was given in Old Church Slavonic and the church 
was distinct from Greek Orthodox Church, helped a lot for the preservation of a 
Serbian identity separate from both Ottomans and Greeks. Also the Ottoman 
taxation methods contributed to the continuation of a collective Serbian 
community. In this system not individuals (households) but villages were 
                                                           
130
 Mazower, M. (2002). The Balkans : from the end of Byzantium to the present day. London: Phoenix, p. 
89.; Adanır, F. in 2008’den 1908’e Bakmak, Dursun, M., Vardagli, T., Toplumsal Arastirma ve Egitim 
Merkezi, & Düne Bakarak Bugünü Anlamak. (2009). Düne bakarak bugünü anlamak : 2008’den 1908’e 
bakmak. Istanbul: Tarem Yayinlari, pp. 107-112.; also as Fikret Adanır cited in Aslantas, S. (2007). 19. 
yüzyilin safaginda Balkanlar : Osmanlida Sirp isyanlari. Istanbul: Kitap yayinevi. p. 11.; Adanir, F. (2006). 
Fransız İhtilali, Sırp Ayaklanması ve Osmanlı Devleti. Toplumsal Tarih, 147. p. 35.  
49 
 
responsible as a whole for a large amount which kept villages intact and village 
life preserved. It is obvious that such system required a village leadership for the 
collection of the taxes. Therefore; Serbs had their headmen, the knezes, and 
assemblies, the skupštinas, who eventually became the leaders of the Serbian 
community.131 
 
Further developments within and around the Serbian community in the course of 
the eighteenth century created the basis for the uprising of 1804 and translated 
the already differentiated societal structure into an ethnically aware and active 
one. For instance, the recapture of Hungary by the Habsburgs where a 
considerable amount of Serbian population lived increased the interactions 
through the border. While modern ideas, such as secularism, constitutionalism, 
rationalism and romanticism, were flowing to the south of the Danube, Serbs 
could visit a place where Christians were not second-class citizens. However; 
this was not the only influence to shape Serbian identity and politics. Also the 
religious difference between Catholic Habsburgs and Orthodox Serbs intensified 
the awareness of the separate Serbian identity once more. In other words “If the 
Ottoman system taught Serbs that they were Christian, the Austrians taught them 
that they were Slavic and Orthodox”132  
 
The developments within the Serbian domains, too, contributed for the 
progression of the Serbian identity and a better societal organization. Two 
significant scholars in this regard have to be mentioned. One is Dositej 
Obradovic (1739-1811) who wrote a Serbian dictionary and systematized the 
grammar. The other is Vuk Karadzic (1787-1864) who collected and published 
Serbian epic poetry. Both contributed much for the Serbian realization and 
awareness of linguistics and cultural heritage which are indispensible from the 
idea of nation. The learning for political and military establishment from 
Habsburgs and Russia was another factor for Serbs to first revolt and take further 
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steps for state building later on.133 In addition, the closure of the Patriarchate of 
Peć in 1776, which subordinated the Serbian Orthodox Church to patriarchate of 
Istanbul, had an important influence for the establishment of a Serbian identity. 
Serbs then became more open to influence from the Habsburg Empire who 
provided them religious and political privileges with the establishment of 
Serbian Orthodox metropolinate in Karlovci, near Novi Sad. This situation more 
and more enabled the flux of ideas and intellectual influence. That is to say, the 
ideals of the Enlightenment along with liberalism and romanticism first 
flourished among the Serbs that lived in Habsburg lands and then transferred or 
brought to the south of the Danube in order to be implemented as a political 
project.134 
 
Pavlowitch agrees that, although there was an active social and political 
environment in the south and north of the Danube for the development of the 
Serbian identity, it was still a “multi-faceted, multi-centered, multi-layered” one 
until the end of the eighteenth century.135 It is only with the nineteenth century 
that the interaction between the populations in the Habsburg lands and those in 
the Ottoman Empire resulted in concrete action. Yet this does not mean that the 
events of the 19th century in Serbia were unilateral and developing under the 
influence of one agreed Serbian identity and one undisputed political program. 
Rather it could be argued that accumulation of ideas and political activism 
finally started to give tangible results, such as uprisings and armed opposition to 
Sultan’s authority.136 
 
It was all clear by the nineteenth century that Ottoman central authority was no 
more able to reach to provinces regularly. Serbia or the Pashalik of Belgrade was 
not an exception in this sense. Janissaries in Belgrade, the most significant 
Ottoman force in the city, were both against the reformist Selim III and in 
pursuit of their own interests. This meant that without any authority they felt 
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from the center they could act freely to increase their wealth and power, 
terrorizing the city. By 1802 the city was dominated with the control of four 
Janissaries, or the dahis. Their rule in Serbia was characterized by disorder 
where robbery and murder became daily phenomena. Fearing that Sultan’s help 
and previous atrocities that they committed were to cause a rebellion, Janissaries 
and their men killed dozens of Serbian notables and priests in February 1804. 
This, however; only led remaining leaders and notables to organize a revolt.137 
 
Although the factors put forward by Pavlowitch, Cox, Paxton and Sowards are 
more related to the own dynamics of the Serbian society, the Balkans 
historiography of the Turkish Republic, in general observes that direct 
intervention by the Great Powers was the determining factor in the process that 
led to independence of these states. Among other factors, this important aspect is 
underlined in Sina Akşin’s formulation where he indicates common factors that 
led to nationalistic movements among the Balkan states.138 Firstly, all 
movements have a literary, philological and historical, meaning written 
background. For instance, it was thanks to Vuk Karadzic’s efforts that a 
developed Serbian language came into being for the identification of the nation. 
Second factor is the rise of a bourgeoisie class, following to economic 
development. However, Akşin, as well as Adanır, believe that this factor is not 
fully valid for Serbia as it was for Bulgaria and they doubt the existence of a 
Serbian bourgeoisie prior to and during the Serbian Revolution.139 Also, the 
example of Montenegro without a full-fledged bourgeoisie class shows that the 
independence could be achieved with the help of the other dominant factors. 
Thirdly, Ottoman misgovernment that led to a tyrant and oppressive local 
feudalism. Akşin believes that neither ayans nor sultans were able to check the 
local discontent caused by this phenomenon in time and they swiftly became 
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international issues as seen in the Serbian and Greek revolts. Finally, the role of 
external agents was named, as the main reason for speedy developments in the 
Balkan lands of the empire. These were the spreading ideas of French 
Revolution, encouragement for the locals to rebel, schools, diplomatic missions 
and most importantly attacks and invasions of the Great Powers that were made 
in the Ottoman lands.140  
 
Russia was the champion of these interventions in favor of the Orthodox 
Christians of the Empire in the course of the 19th century as she supported 
Serbia by sending army, doctors, volunteers and officers when she declared war 
on the Ottoman Empire in 1876 and before. French and British public opinions 
were very influential by putting pressure on their government, especially during 
the Greek Revolution. Russia not only encouraged and supported nationalistic 
movements but also showed Balkan Christians how weak the Empire was by the 
destructive wars she fought.141 In the end it was Russo-Ottoman wars of 1806-12 
and 1828-29 that resulted in treaties of Bucharest and Edirne to provide 
autonomy for Serbia and the war of 1877-78 that bestowed full independence to 
Serbia. 
 
Furthermore; Sina Akşin criticizes some Turkish authors who underlined the 
influence of French Revolution a lot but did not like to criticize the Empire’s 
own policies, misrule and poorly fought wars in the region. This is significant, 
because although he claims that the interventions by the Great Powers, 
especially Russia, were the most influential factor in the rise of the nationalisms, 
this would be less viable without the Ottoman decline and misrule. Therefore the 
blame should not be put solely on French and Russians, he implies, as many 
popular Turkish historians have done so far.142 
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3.1. First uprisings: 1804-16 
 
The issue of separatist movement in the 19th century Ottoman history is a very 
multi-faceted one. Therefore; looking into narratives of historians from different 
understandings for this part of the history could be very useful for a discussion 
of historiography. As mentioned, there are several factors and themes that are 
vital in defining the early 19th century history of the Ottoman Empire, such as; 
the French Revolution, Ottoman misadministration, local notables, declines 
army and land regime, interventions of the Great Powers and own dynamics of 
the millets. 
 
In terms of the French Revolution’s influence on the Ottoman Empire, Serbs 
were one step ahead of the other Christian millets as they were the first society 
to be influenced by the ideas of the French Revolution through the trade 
relations in a mercantilist environment, literate traders and their educated family 
members and fellows living in the Austrian realms that were once Ottoman. 
With several other factors, Serbs became rebellious against the Ottoman rule. 
However; Zürcher believes that the reason of the very first uprising (1804) was 
not national in character, but only against the misrule.143 He also underlines that, 
in time, the demands and nature of the unrest changed and acquired the character 
of independence movement. 
 
In the Turkish Republican era historiography, this issue was approached by 
many authors in different ways but before going into the historians’ approach, it 
has to be said that the discourse, selection of words and formulation of the event 
will be dealt in this chapter and characters that led the Serbian independence 
movement, such as Kara George and Obrenovic family, will be mainly discussed 
in the Chapter III. 
 
To start with a leftist historian, Yerasimos, as it was previously observed too, 
has a more thematically and theoretical approach. According to Yerasimos, there 
was already a corrupted state structure, a misadministration and rise of 
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bourgeoisie caused by the emergence of the çiftliks, ayans and Christian 
merchants, in the Balkan lands of the Ottoman Empire. This situation actually 
implies heavy burden on peasantry’s shoulder and prerequisites of a revolution. 
However, since this expected revolution could not be achieved by the Balkan 
populations as a whole, the local bourgeoisie class that was influenced by the 
national ideals set up for their own revolutions. “First to act were the Serbs who 
had a national nucleus and consisted a majority in a certain area” says 
Yerasimos.144 In this view of the events of the early 19th century the foreign 
intervention is not a defining factor, rather socio-economical determinants seems 
to be far more relevant. 
 
Sina Akşin, too, argues that the exploitation and injustice that the Serbian 
society experienced in the hands of the unruly Janissaries is the main reason for 
the rebellion of 1804. On the other hand, he emphasizes that, this does not mean 
that the influence of the French Revolution, indoctrination of the Great Powers 
and a national character was not there in Serbia.145 In Akşin’s argumentation it is 
unclear how these national ideas infiltrated into the Serbian society but he 
definitely believes that Serbs rebelled with a hidden national idea. A little 
different from what Yerasimos thought, Akşin credits nationalistic ideas along 
the oppression and injustice that Serbian society have been going through. 
 
Looking at Đsmail Hami Danişmend’s 19th century narrative, it is not really 
possible to claim that it differs significantly from the fourteenth and the fifteenth 
century accounts as he starts with the “Serbian Rebellion” issue by implying that 
the reason for Janissaries to act violently was the guardian of Belgrade Hacı 
Mustafa Pasha’s collaboration with the Serbs to fight against them. It seems that 
the responsibility of the events belonged to the pasha who allied with the enemy, 
who eventually was killed by the Janissaries. He adds that Serbian rebellion was 
done with a national consciousness right from the beginning. It is also 
understood that Kara George, a pig trader, first was a hajdut in the service of the 
Austria, turned his back to his Austrian masters after he secured help from Slav 
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Russia. Russians, from this point on became very influential in the Serbian cause 
as they provoked Serbs and Montenegrins once the unruly Janissaries were 
eliminated.146 From the general outlook of the events in Danişmend’s history, it 
might be understood that Janissaries were stabbed from behind by the pasha, 
who supposed to act in accordance with the janissary wishes. Furthermore, the 
reason for things to get out of hand is the elimination of the Janissaries which 
left the Ottomans weak in Belgrade. From this point on, Serbs who got rid of the 
Janissaries and received help from the Russians acted freely, even arrogantly 
vis-a-vis the Sublime Porte. Due to the danger of war with Russia, the Sublime 
Porte decided to reach an agreement with the Serbs. However, this unwritten and 
unapproved agreement was immediately broken by Kara George and Serbs 
could get in the Belgrade fortress thanks to betrayer gatekeeper Aziz Bey. Kara 
George, who felt powerful with these developments killed many Muslims in 
Belgrade and decided to fight until full independence. Without aforementioned 
socio-economical problems and any oppression by the Janissaries, Danişmend 
argues that Serbs felt free do act disloyally, did not hesitate to break the 
agreements and betrayed in every occasion, which seems very one sided. 
 
Another historian that is regarded as extreme nationalist, Rıza Nur, writes 
literally nothing about the Serbian issue in the section dedicated to Selim III.147 
Very interestingly, in his book he uses the word “Serb” more frequently and 
directly than Danişmend, however; they are mostly used in the earlier sections 
where he writes extensively about how the corruption in the Ottoman palace was 
started with the marriage of Bayezid I with Olivera Despina. He underlines the 
Serbian influence as a disastrous one for the Turkishness several times and 
clearly. However, when it comes to rebellion itself very surprisingly he skips the 
subject. 
 
Yılmaz Öztuna, as a moderate right wing writer, approaches the issue with a 
different point of view. He relates the Serbian independence movement to 
burning down of the Serbian towns with Pazvandoğlu Osman Ağa’s attacks to 
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Ottoman fortresses and the oppression of the Janissaries who are anything but 
soldiers. With this formulation of the Serbian issue, he criticizes the 
administrative weakness that led to disturbances in the Serbian lands. He states 
“This nation’s rebellion against the Turkish rule was not completely unjust. 
They were not the reaya that were treated with mercy by the state anymore. 
Janissaries in and around Belgrade were treating the Serbs just like dogs. These 
Janissaries even killed Hacı Mustafa Pasha, the guardian of Belgrade.”148 
Öztuna, furthermore, gives the year 1806 as the starting date of the Serbian 
rebellion instead of 1804 and he is sure about its nationalistic nature under the 
influence of the French Revolution.  
 
On the other hand, the lesson that Babıali has to take from this movement 
according to Öztuna is the need for the establishment of a modern army to 
protect these Balkan lands where Turks constitute a majority just like 
Anatolia.149 Unlike his approach to rebellion issue, the idea of Turkishness in 
Balkan lands is far-fetched. Even if it is assumed that his calculation of Turks 
include the Muslim societies like the Albanians and Bosniaks, it is obvious that 
the case of Turkish majority cannot be true for Serbia. 
 
The first president of the Türk Tarih Kurumu, Yusuf Akçura explains the 
Serbian uprising, with the date of 1805, in his book Osmanlı Devletinin Dağılma 
Devri (“The Period of Disintegration of the Ottoman State”). According to 
Akçura, there was neither janissary oppression nor killing of Serbs on behalf of 
the Ottoman forces. Rather it was an internal dispute among the Ottoman 
soldiers and Serbs immediately wanted to exploit the issue. They rebelled and 
plundered Belgrade. Russians also have been provoking the Christians, who 
were Turkish subjects, since the time of Petro I (reigned: 1682-1725) and they 
did provoke Serbs with this occasion as well.150 Further, he concurs with other 
historians like Akşin, by expressing the second factor for the rebellion as the 
nationalism and Slavism that were developed in the Austrian lands. 
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As an Islamist historian, Ziya Nur Aksun has a significant contribution for the 
understanding of the Serbian revolt in Turkey. Although in Đslâm Tarihi it is 
only stated that “Serbian rebellion occurred in 1804” 151 without any further 
detail, it is possible to find some more information in his six-volume work 
Osmanlı Tarihi. Aksun states: 
  
“The Balkan nations who forgot that they could be able keep their 
national character only thanks to Ottomans and who have always been 
shorn of a consciousness of history, started to rebel with the efforts of 
Russian agents as well. These tiny Balkan nations, who lived a 
peaceful life under Ottoman protection, were provoked to rebel 
against their benevolent and just overlords by the capture of their 
priests and with the help of the money. After all, these tiny states 
became toys for European states, ending in disappointment. 
Independence turned out to be disastrous for these states.”152  
 
In this amazing understanding of the history there is neither a question about the 
long-lasting wars of the 18th century nor any kind of misadministration on 
behalf of the Ottoman government. Furthermore, he believes that actually 
Janissaries were the real victims of this process as these important border 
soldiers were deprived from their incomes and Serbs were set free by the 
mistaken Pashas who collaborated with the Serbs.153 Other interesting themes by 
Aksun for this chapter of the Ottoman history could be given too. Still in 1812, 
he argues, Serbian people were not supporting their rebellious leaders. In his 
narrative, Aksun occasionally calls Serbs and Montenegrins as “wild” (“vahşi”) 
and mountainous (“dağlı”) people which have undoubtedly pejorative 
connotations in the Turkish language. Finally, if it was not for the abolition of 
national the janissary army, which he believes was a disastrous event, none of 
the Balkan nations could have become separated from the Ottoman Empire. 
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It appears to be that the provocation of the Great Powers is a shared theme by 
almost all the historians in order to explain the Serbian uprising and Zuhuri 
Danışman is not an exception in this sense as he believes Russians started their 
provocation from 1805 onwards in order to counter-balance the French influence 
in the region and good relations that were being established between Napoleon 
and Selim III. Also, in terms of nationalism in Serbia, Danışman argues that it 
has always been existent due to the Ottoman tolerance on Christian subjects 
which enabled Serbs to keep their church and monasteries as they were until the 
19th century. This is how they transferred their identity and traditions through 
the generations.154 
 
Furthermore, it is possible to deduce from the Danışman’s narrative that 
nationalism played a crucial role in the beginning of the Serbian uprising. This 
already built-in nationalistic ideal in Serbia was used by Russia in order to harm 
the Ottoman Empire from the inside. With all the effort, in Danışman’s words: 
 
“Serbs decided to make a rebellion. However, since they knew that 
such a rebellion would be suppressed by the state they looked for a 
solution to make it look legitimate. They finally found the justification 
in the unruly Janissaries who were called dayıs, treated the people 
badly and acted as bandits”155 
 
This idea shows that, just as Akşin argues, Serbs kept their real nationalistic 
intentions and aspirations secret in the uprising and made it look like it was a 
problem with the local administration. 
 
3.2. Steps towards the Independent Serbia: 1816-78 
 
The eventful period that led to the independent Serbia was discussed in detail by 
the Turkish historians. Therefore, the focus will be on the rhetorical aspect, 
language and discourse, rather than the chronological political history. 
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There is not much detail in Danişmend’s narrative until things get complicated 
in Belgrade in year 1862. He mentions that Serbian head knez Miloš Obrenović 
was approved by the Istanbul government as the hereditary prince of Serbia in 
1830. After 1860s, Serbs are fully determined to push the Turks out of Belgrade 
and Serbia. While trying everything to reach this goal, Serbs never stopped 
playing the innocent towards the European public opinion since because 
although they secured almost unlimited aid from Russia, it was obvious that 
without the western powers, they would not get what was intended. In such a 
tense environment, one incident pulled the trigger. A Serbs, who wanted to get 
water before a Turkish soldier was killed by him and this led to a huge turmoil in 
Belgrade. Serbs, who were obviously looking for this kind of reason, rebelled, 
plundered the Muslim sector of the city and attacked barracks as well as houses. 
Guardian of the fortress, Aşir Pasha, bombarded the town. This event became 
very symbolic in depicting the rightfulness and victimization of the Serbs in 
European eyes. While Britain and Austria were a bit resistant, Russia and France 
immediately intervened to the issue and made sure that Serbs were favored. 
From 1862 onwards, Muslims in Belgrade could only live in the fortress and 
garrisons in the city were left to Serbs. According to Danişmend, although the 
articles of the protocol clearly favored the Serbs and unjust for “Turkey” they 
were still unhappy.156 Almost by using the same words, Akşin states the fact that 
Serbs would be content with nothing but complete freedom and he mentions 
about the pro-Serbs European public opinion.157 Actually, soon, last four 
fortresses in Ottoman control were left to Serbs with both flags hoisted  
however, Danişmend says, “the existence of the Turkish flag alongside the 
Serbian flag was only to satisfy the national pride” and had no real meaning at 
all.158 
 
Coming towards the last quarter of the century, Russia centered and oriented 
Slavic associations were working harder than ever in order to prepare the 
Serbian, Bosnian, Montenegrin and Bulgarian Christians for their “bloody roles” 
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against their Ottoman rulers and they were provided with money, arms and 
ammunition secretly.159 With this approach, to Herzegovina rebellion of 1875 
and coming great Russo-Ottoman War of 1877-78, Danişmend has a writing 
style that implies without Russian provocation none of these would have 
happened. Serbs on the other hand, were active in supporting the Herzegovina 
rebellion with volunteers and therefore “Turks had to fight against Serbs besides 
the rebels”. Also, during the Bulgarian rebellion of 1876, Serbian agents, besides 
the Russians, were there to help the Bulgarians.160 It is understood that by this 
time Serbs has even the means to help other rebellions. Regarding the Serbian 
inclusion to Russo-Ottoman War, Danişmend argues that, after the fall of Pleven 
Serbs broke their peace agreement and declared war with a very pragmatist 
move. They advanced as far as Niš. 161 
 
Furthermore, Rıza Nur gives less historical detail but surely more comments on 
the events. According to him, the idea of nationalism could be observed among 
Serbs and Bulgarians from 1850 onwards and despite the Paris Treaty of 1856 
banned Russians to intervene Ottoman politics, they did intervene frequently to 
use these ideas against the Ottoman Empire on the ground that the Christian 
subjects were being oppressed.162 Similar to Danişmend, Rıza Nur do not 
directly blame the Balkan nations for rebellions and underlines the Russian 
intrigues. In many occasions he uses “Russian provocation”, “Russian agents’ 
provocation” and “Ignatiev’s Panislavist policies” as explanatory factors. On the 
1877-78 Russo-Ottoman War’s result, he says “Berlin Treaty, as others, was an 
outcome of Russian and other western states’ efforts and with this war they 
“hanged the Balkan nations to our neck just like a dagger.”163 As a general note 
on the issues of the 19th century, Rıza Nur states that “Russian and European 
enmity for Turks is well-known. They have been using Serbs, Bulgarians, 
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Armenians and alike in order to reach their aims. Serbs and other subject nations 
enforced the provocations that were made against us.”164 
 
Yılmaz Öztuna, unlike his approach to fourteenth and fifteenth century’s history, 
gives more dates and events and less comments. His narrative on the 19th 
century Serbia, however, surely includes nationalistic references. For instance, 
he writes “it is known that Montenegrins are Serbs”, “Fortress of Belgrade was 
conquered by Suleyman I [...]. Turkish garrisons and people were leaving the 
fortress. However; the Turkish flag was going to continue flapping“165 or “... 
princedom of Serbia and Montenegro that were part of the Turkish Empire.”166 
These few of many examples show that this is the era of nationalism 
undoubtedly and each state has to be associated with one ethnic or national 
grouping. 
 
Besides, the general idea of Öztuna regarding the 1816-1867 period is the 
gradual loss of Serbia without attributing much will on Serbs and emphasizing 
heavily on Russian and French influence for this loss. The reader possibly is to 
understand that without these interventions, Serbian people would stay in 
Ottoman realms, which is very suitable to the 14th century narrative of Ottoman 
expansion which brought a just rule to the Balkans. For instance, it is underlined 
by all right wing historians that Serbian prince Mihailo Obrenović came to 
Istanbul in order to thank personally for the grace of the sultan by bestowing the 
control of the fortress of Belgrade to Serbs.167 Serbs’ rebellion is by no means a 
self motivated one in this case. They are all driven by the Russian foreign 
politics and it is hard to guess whether they would rebel without such a power 
backing them like this. Although this theme of content Serbs and Balkan people 
is much more visible in Ziya Nur Aksun’s narratives, Öztuna’s approach is 
similar too. 
 
                                                           
164
 Riza Nur, & Kiliç, E. (1978). Türk tarihi (Vol. 3). p. 112. 
165
 Öztuna, Y. (1977). Başlangıcından zamanımıza kadar büyük Türkiye tarihi (Vol. 7). p. 70. 
166
 Ibid. p. 123. 
167
 Ibid. p. 70. 
62 
 
Furthermore; in this period Ottoman rule was in its last fifty-years and Serbia 
was lost in practice. Even in such conditions, according to Öztuna, the state 
shows grace to Serbs and in return the Serbian prince comes all the way to 
Istanbul to show his gratitude. This seems to be a dream of the fourteenth 
century since an Ottoman state that bestows out of greatness is depicted for the 
readers. 
  
Coming closer to the great Russo-Ottoman war of 1877-78, Öztuna describes the 
“Turkey”. While Serbia and Montenegro principalities were only Russian 
toys168, they were very useful for weakening the empire. If the rebellions were to 
turn into a war, this would definitely mean a terrible loss of national interests 
against the European imperialism. “Turkey” was also in a very disadvantageous 
position both geographically, as being open to invasion and intervention, and 
demographically for not having a national unity unlike Japan who have not 
started her modernization neither but had the geographical advantage and 
national unity.169 This section could solely be sufficient to indicate how vital and 
fundamental the idea of nationhood in Öztuna’s conception. He both refers to 
empire as the Turkish Empire and also regrets that its national unity has not 
completed yet. 
 
Although Öztuna describes quite a dire situation for the Ottoman Empire during 
the last quarter of the 19th century, there are contradictory expressions that 
would boost the national pride. On October 29th, 1876, right before the Tersane 
Conference, the Serbian army that was commanded by Russian general 
Chernyayev was defeated by the Turkish army in Aleksinac battle. While 
Turkish army was advancing towards Belgrade, Russia gave an ultimatum. 
Then, Öztuna says, “The Sublime Porte bestowed a two-months truce to its 
rebellious Serbian subjects”170 It is not easily understandable how could Istanbul 
government have “bestowed” a truce to rebellious Serbian subjects when it is 
being done right after a Russian ultimatum. A similar situation was stated during 
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the reign of Abdülhamid II. In this era, Öztuna argues, Serbia, Montenegro and 
Romania were in balance. Bulgarian autonomous and Serbian independent 
princes were “loyal servants” of the Sultan Hamid. They were receiving their 
salaries from him and in the meantime “Nikola, the old prince of Montenegro, 
was unhappy since he could not have these honors.”171 Even after the 
independence of Serbia, Öztuna prefers to perceive and introduce the situation as 
such to the readers. This is a very grandiose discourse compared to the political 
realities. He obviously wants this state to be a nationally united Turkish Empire, 
an oxymoron so to say, and even the state that gained independence still be 
called as “bende” (“slave”). 
 
For this period of Ottoman-Serbian history, Islamist historian Ziya Nur Aksun 
has actually a similar style of writing with his narrative of early Ottoman history. 
He frequently uses belittling terms like “wild” (“vahşi”), mountainous (“dağlı”) 
or “tiny subject of ours was disciplined” for the Balkan nations.172 
 
Aksun, just like Danişmend, argues about the Serbian pragmatism for inclusion 
to war only after the fall of Pleven to get a share from the “Turkey bequest” and 
he also qualifies this alliance as a crusade unlike any other historian.173 This 
actually is a brilliant paragraph to observe how entangled the nationalism and 
Islamic sensitiveness in Turkish historiography and particularly Aksun’s 
narrative. 
 
As seen previously, Aksun really a historian that emphasizes the Turkishness of 
the Ottoman Empire and the national pride. It could be useful to have two quotes 
that Aksun had incorporated to his history. First one is about Serbian prince 
Milan’s visit to Istanbul. Regarding his request of two districts’ addition to his 
control, the sultan gives a proud and dignified reply: “I may send my glorious 
troops to protect you from any danger. But for enlarging territory, I do not have 
such authority since every inch of those lands was taken in return for the blood 
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of the martyrs.”174 Secondly the letter of Chernyayev to Russian Tsar is added to 
Aksun’s narrative in order to depict the successes of the Ottoman army in 
Aleksinac in October 1876. According to Chernyayev the main reason for the 
defeat was the extremely positive memories that were alive in Serbian people’s 
minds. He believes that it is possible to create an army of Serbs form nothing 
and send them to death but he was unable to transcend these memories. “Turkish 
sovereignty, just like a mind dazzling magician’s trick, had taken these places. 
We have to beat not only the Turks but their history as well.” are Chernyayev’s 
exact words to describe the situation.175 
 
The last Turkish historian on the subject, Zuhuri Danışman has a similar 
approach with Đsmail Hami Danişmend especially in the description of the 
events in Belgrade between 1862 and 1867. However, Danışman decides not to 
incorporate the story about the killed Serb who wanted to get water before an 
Ottoman soldier. He suffices to write that “the relations between Muslims and 
Serbs became intense and there were killings on both sides.”176 After Serbs 
rebelled and Muslims took refuge in the fortress guardian Aşir Pasha used 
artillery to push the Serbs away. In this case, Danışman argues strongly that with 
this action “Turks were completely rightful” however due to the protests of 
foreign diplomatic missions in Belgrade and European newspapers’ fake news 
on how Serbs were killed in the events, Serbs were favored. He also believes 
that Serbs who were under the influence of constant provocation of the French 
and Russian foreign policy were not happy with the result that actually favored 
them over the Ottoman Empire. Regarding the events of Belgrade in 1862-67 
periods, Đsmail Hami Danişmend, Yılmaz Öztuna and Zuhuri Danışman write 
with almost same style and word with negligible differences. Danışman too adds 
that Mihailo came to Istanbul to thank the sultan for giving the castle to Serbs 
but only with a plain description and not in an overlooking way.177  
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According to Danışman, Russia in this period was planning to establish an 
empire that encompasses all the Slavs in the Balkans. To reach this end, an 
association was opened in Moscow by Chancellor Gorchakov. Likewise, 
textbooks that has the idea of Slavic unity were sent to Serbian schools and 
“young people who were our subjects were taken to Russian universities”.178 
This period of propaganda gave results in 1876. Serbs and Montenegrins agreed 
and declared war to whom that they were supposed to be subjects. They were all 
very sure about the Russian support and even armies were commanded by the 
Russian general Chernyayev. The following chapters of these event are similarly 
knit with Russian support, Turkish army’s successes and Turkish invasion 
southern Serbia. That is to say, in the right wing history writing it is claimed 
almost with no exception that a Serbian insurrection movement is predominantly 
a result of Russian intervention and support. While this argumentation overlooks 
the Serbian national formation and refers no power and will at all to Serbian 
people or the leaders –except the will to betray the Turks and collaborate with 
the Russians-it also prematurely emphasizes the Turkishness of the Ottoman 
state and army. 
 
3.3. Independent Serbia 
Usually Turkish historians do not specifically write about the Serbia that gained 
independence recently in their Ottoman histories, but still it is possible to deduce 
some information between the lines. For instance, Đsmail Hami Danişmend 
argues that during the first Macedonian Revolution in 1902, Serbian agents 
alongside the Russian had a significant role.179 This information implies that 
Serbian state has the will and power to intervene the surrounding regions in a 
very direct manner. 
 
For this period, the things that Rıza Nur has to say are much more intense. He 
believes that “[i]f we had the policies of representation, undoubtedly those lands 
would still be ours. Furthermore, in those lands Turkishness has more right than 
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the Serbs.”180 Rıza Nur, therefore, ascribes very little right for Serbs to live and 
rule in those lands and for him the reason that Serbia was lost is the policies that 
gave too much freedom for them. 
 
There are also important ideas in Ziya Nur Aksun’s narrative for Serbia, after 
her independence. According to Aksun, the post-Berlin Conference period left 
Serbia and Montenegro frustrated who were expecting to share Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. This is one of the main reasons that rendered Serbia aggressive 
and hateful towards the neighboring states. This was best shown in their greed 
and aspirations for Macedonia.181 With this explanation it is firstly understood 
that Serbia is now a hateful and irredentist state for the surrounding Christian 
states. Secondly, Serbia was used and cheated by Russia and were not given 
what she was promised. As the region became a powder keg with these 
developments and was heading to a great war, Aksun thinks maybe it could after 
all these pain and suffering that the Serbs and other petty Balkan states could 
understand how good and prosperous the Sultan Abdülhamid II rule was. He 
writes “The nations that lived in the lands he once ruled faced great tragedies 
and suffer, hence; they kept the Sultan’s age of prosperity and happiness as a 
sweet memory in their minds.”182 It is shown in Aksun’s narrative clearly that let 
alone being happy about independence; Serbs regretted turning their back to 
Ottomans. However; it was too late. 
 
As a general note on the developments in Serbia in the independent era, Jelavich 
gives direct information. In this narrative, it is also argued that Serbia did not 
achieved great social and political goals for its people and economical activities 
of 1810s did not differ much that of even 1930s. Surely these problems in Serbia 
were not due to betrayal to Ottomans in Jelavich, rather caused by bad political 
leadership, self-interested, wealth accumulating elite and nepotism.183 
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CHAPTER 4 
CHARACTERS 
 
 
The previous two chapters discuss the political events of the Ottoman-Serbian 
common history in a chronological manner; in this chapter, the focus will be on 
the characters that would hopefully provide direct images and depictions of the 
prominent Serbs in the early Ottoman history as were narrated in the popular 
historiography. 
 
4.1. Serbs in the Early Ottoman Period 
 
Almost without exception, Turkish historians agree that Dušan was a great 
commander and had aspired to the throne of the Byzantine Empire. His reign not 
only represented the first encounter that Ottomans had with the Serbs but also 
with a king who wanted gain the control of the same region, namely the Bytinia 
and southern Balkans regions. However, important he was as ruler there is 
noneless very little information regarding his character and his political 
ideology. It is only Öztuna who dwells upon the subject and relates Dušan to 
Ottoman politics. 
 
According to Öztuna, Duşan‘s goal was to eventually become the emperor of the 
Byzantine lands. It was under his command that the Serbian army pushed into 
Macedonia, at the expense of the Byzantines. And this military act led to a 
political alliance between the Byzantine Empire and Orhan. Actually, it was 
Dušan who first wanted to make an alliance with Orhan against the Byzantines 
by offering his daughter to one of Orhan’s sons. However, this offer was not 
welcomed by Orhan. As Öztuna argues, “establishment of a Slavic empire in the 
Balkans was completely against Turkish politics.”184 In this sense, Dušan 
identifies the first Slavic fear of Turks. Although at this point in history the 
validity of a Slavic union as a political ideology in the Serbian lands is 
problematic and doubtful, Öztuna accepts this notion for the purposes of his 
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arugment and explains that this Turks vs. Slavs clash has been an determinant 
dynamic of the Balkans politics right from the 14th century up until the 20th 
century. Here, for six hundred years, are the three states struggling for political 
power in the region. Through a reliance on the concepts of “danger” (i.e. the 
Serbian or Slavic danger) and “alliance”, which refers to a search for a power 
balance between Byzantium and the Ottomans, Öztuna explains the potential rise 
for both Ottoman and Serbian states  as what makes them natural enemies.  
 
Furthermore, regarding King Lazar and the Lazarević family some information 
could be found from the time of the Kosovo Battle to Ottoman Interregnum in 
the Turkish narratives as well. Generally King Lazar was described as a proud 
commander, certain about the victory in Kosovo. This trait was very visible, for 
instance in Zuhuri Danışman’s narrative as the sarcastic Serbian envoy comes to 
the Ottoman military quarters to boast about Serbian army in front of Murad I. 
All historians who have written about the Kosovo Battle of 1389 agree that King 
Lazar was either killed in the Battle field or executed in front of the sultan’s tent 
after the battle.185 Only Ziya Nur Aksun writes that Bayezid negotiated with the 
King without giving his name.186 Aksun is either  mistaken or should have 
refered to one of Lazar’s sons (most probably Stefan) as the new king. 
 
Miloš is also a significant charachter of the Kosovo Battle as he killed Sultan 
Murad I. This killing was mentioned by Öztuna, Danışman, Danişmend and 
Aksun as a tricky one. On the one hand, Miloš could achieve this regicide by 
telling one irresistible lie, regarding his conversion to Islam to the Sultan, an act 
which makes him a manipulative liar in the eyes of the Turkish readers. On the 
other hand, historians, such as; Ziya Nur Aksun and Zuhuri Danışman suggest 
that this false conversion has nothing to do with Serbian nationalism or his 
identity as a war hero; rather,  Miloš murdered the Sultan to erase his name from 
an assertion made by his rival, a very personal issue.187 
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Bayezid I (known in history by his war prowess as Bayazid the Thunderbolt) and 
his reign was one of those times during which the Serbs were extremely active in 
Ottoman politics and military. Despite the predominantly underestimating 
approach to the good relations between Serbs and the Ottomans in the aftermath 
of the Kosovo Battle, instead of struggle and fight, cooperation and alliance is 
observed. Regarding this coexistence, differing ideas and a variety of narratives   
have been asserted by popular Turkish historigraphy. 
 
One historian, Zuhuri Danışman, in this sense praises Bayezid I for his 
benevolent policy towards Serbia. He, instead of destroying Serbia, made her a 
vassal territory and this action resulted with appreciation, rather than hatred, 
among the Serbs for Ottoman rule. Stefan agreed to pay a yearly tribute, send 
soldiers upon request and marry his sister Olivera Despina to Bayezid. 
Danışman believes that Bayezid’s policy of cooperation with Serbs yielded very 
good results as Serbs supported Ottomans against the Hungarian expansion and 
fought loyally in the Battle of Ankara in 1402. Regarding this alliance, 
Danışman makes an interesting analogy as well. He writes “a very beneficial 
relationship was established between the Ottomans and Serbia [with this 
marriage]. Indeed it was seen that Serbian forces fought loyally in the battles of 
Nicopolis and Ankara. Just like Bayezid stayed loyal to his wife until the end of 
his life, Serbs stayed loyal to Ottomans.”188 Similar to Dušan’s unsuccesful 
attempt to establish alliance with Orhan, with the marriage of Stefan’s sister 
(Lazar’s daughter) with Bayezid I, Ottoman common history with Serbia was 
once more defined with a Serbian princess. 
 
Danışman also includes his narrative the opportunity that Bayezid I gave them to 
gather war booty. This idea of a ‘mutually beneficial relationship’ between 
Ottomans and Serbs that could be deduced in Danışman’s narrative is almost 
unique in the popular historiography in Turkey. There is no ambiguity in the 
good nature of the relations between the two in Danışman’s history. 
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While Serbian contributions have been discussed and explained negatively and 
positively by the popular historians, Ziya Nur Aksun, on the contrary, 
completely neglects the issue. In his Đslam Tarihi there are no references to the 
marriage of Olivera Despina to the Sultan, her brothers’ support for the Ankara 
Battle, and the establishment of  Ottoman-Serbian family ties.189 
 
Öztuna includes the Serbian soldiers in his explanation of the Ankara Battle. He 
argues that around 10.000 Serbian soldiers were located in the left wing of the 
Ottoman army and they were controlled by Stefan Lazarević, Bayezid’s brother-
in-law.190 However, according to Öztuna, once the situation of the battle became 
disadvantageous for the Ottomans, Serbs retreated and escaped from the 
battlefield. Against this argument, Nicolas Vatin believes that Serbs were only 
loyal forces to Bayezid I with the Janissaries in the most fragile phase of the 
Battle of Ankara. While Bayezid’s situation was desperate, Stefan Lazarević 
protected Prince Suleyman which, according to Vatin, was an attitude to keep 
the state standing and alive in the midst of a terrible defeat.191 
 
The marriage of Bayezid I with the Serbian princess Olivera Despina has 
attracted a great deal of attention from Turkish historians from all camps. Rıza 
Nur, in this regard, is surely the most striking historian with his extremely 
critical and harsh stance. Rıza Nur several times argues that although the first 
sultans lived simply and had good morals, with the coming of Olivera Despina, 
corruption, indecency, libation and pederasty started at the time of Bayezid I. He 
believes that  
 
“It is this woman that familiarized the Thunderbolt to libation. So it is 
understood that these foreign women were the illness of this Turkish 
dynasty. His vizier Osman Pasha, too, familiarized him to sodomy. 
Then the boys that he used for his own enjoyment were given timars, 
official posts and used as bureaucrats. These boys were taken among 
Greeks, Bulgarians, Serbs, Russians and alike non-Turkish foreign 
lands. These are documented information. The filth and low character 
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that the Thunderbolt has started (with his wife) continued for 
centuries.”192 
 
Furthermore, Yılmaz Öztuna dedicates a section to the mothers and wives of the 
sultans. He argues that in the 14th century most of the sultan’s wives were of 
Anatolian Turkish origin, such as the daughters of Karaman, Candar, Dulkadir, 
Germiyan principalities. He adds that they also married some Serbians as well. 
Without giving any names, Öztuna writes that the Serbian princess wives of 
Bayezid I and Murad II are famous. Yet it appears that they are not sufficiently 
famous for their names to be mentioned. In the eighty-page long section of his 
book, Öztuna suffices to write that they kept their Christian faith, and supported 
Turkish policies in Serbia. The latter is exemplified by, Mehmed II’s Serbian 
step-mother, Mara, who served as a political tool.193 Thus, she only is once 
mentioned as the Fatih’s political tool for the Balkans and no other name was 
given. Öztuna’s brief and cautious approach to the issue could be caused by a 
defensive idea that proves to his readers the fact that marriage occurred only due 
to the political expectations, making the subject a complete taboo for the Turkish 
readers.  
 
It might not be a far-fetched idea to argue that, the omission regarding the 
mothers and wives of the sultans with foreign and non-Turkic background 
implies the protectionist feelings that the author bears and is actually an 
intentional choice. In this section, Öztuna underlines that the princesses of 
Turkish and Anatolian dynastic origin constitute a clear plurality among the 
wives of the sultans. Is hardy understandable, however, what kind of an idea of 
plurality he wants to give to the readers if Nilüfer (Holofira), Olivera Despina 
and Mara were to be omitted. Furthermore; in Öztuna’s book Osmanlı 
Padişahları’nın Hayat Hikayeleri (“Life Stories of the Ottoman Sultans”) there 
is no single reference to Olivera Despina in the Bayezid the Thunderbolt 
section;194 furthermore,  in the Mehmed II section he writes “his step-mother, the 
Serbian princess Mara has taught many things, probably Serbian language as 
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well.”195 This mention is the only one regarding the Serbian princesses in the 
entire book. 
 
Ziya Nur Aksun’s approach regarding Princess Olivera Despina is also very 
significant. Actually, Aksun’s basic approach is to exclude her from the Ottoman 
history. Regarding neither Olivera nor her brothers a single word could be 
found. However, his writings about Bayezid’s character reveal some indirect 
information. Aksun puts so much effort to save Bayezid from the criticisms by 
some “old and new historians” and emphasizes heavily his good nature and 
Islamic values such as keeping away from alcohol and regularly praying, that it 
becomes obvious that those criticisms are related to Olivera Despina and her 
alleged negative influence on him.196 Furthermore, it is not possible to find 
information regarding the existence of Serbian soldiers in the Battle of Ankara, 
the interregnum struggles and princess Mara’s marriage with Murad II in 
Aksun’s narrative. To sum up, it is understood that Ziya Nur Aksun, as an 
Islamist historian, is not happy with and sensitive towards some parts of the 
Ottoman history; hence he omits any parts that might tarnish the character of his  
subject, preferring to glorify him over Islamic values. 
 
Furthermore; Necip Fazıl, another Islamist author, argues quite the contrary. 
With reference to his wife, he argues that Bayezid’s problematic situation was 
almost destroying the Turkish society which was at its one of the highest degrees 
of ambition and livelihood. While one Islamist author sees nothing wrong in the 
Bayezid I era, the other criticizes him heavily for letting in foreign blood. During 
the Battle of Ankara, as Necip Fazıl further argues, the illness of foreign blood 
was apparent both in Janissaries and in “so-called loyal to Turks” Serbian King’s 
attitudes who deserted the battlefield.197 
 
Finally, Zuhuri Danışman briefly mentions the relationship between Bayezid I, 
Olivera and alcohol. He argues that Bayezid drank alcohol from time to time, 
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just as Osman and Orhan did, but this never reached the level to prevent him 
from ruling the state properly. Danışman writes “He was extremely fond of his 
wife Olivera, however; that would not be pleasant to claim that he got used to 
alcohol and did not care about the state because of her.” 198 Also, he emphasizes 
that Serbs were active in the Ottoman palace without any reference to a negative 
influence or blame on Olivera Despina. Danışman is by far the most open 
historian about this issue. 
 
 
4.2. Servants of the Sultan 
 
Murad I‘s usage of war prisoners for a stable manpower supply was 
institutionalized at the time of Bayezid and until the early 17th century Ottoman 
state selected Christian boys to educate them as soldiers and officials. These 
boys, once received, converted to Islam and were taught the necessary 
information to become the servants of the Ottoman sultans.199 Köprülü also 
argues that the janissary force that was composed of young prisoners was at first 
a standing infantry in the company of the sultan. The cavalry force created by 
the timar-holding sipahis, however, constituted the greatest military force of the 
Ottoman state. In the 14th century, the Janissaries were not of major importance. 
It was only in the fifteenth century during the reign of Murad II that the principle 
of devshirme was instituted in a systematic manner.200 
 
It is obvious that the issue is controversial from both sides. Before discussing the 
Turkish historians’ ideas and comments on the devshirme system, Yerasimos 
explains the general nature of the practice of devshirme in the Ottoman Empire 
from the Christian families’ point of view. He believes that it was actually 
welcomed by the families in most cases if the regulations are well applied. He 
even claims that families offered their children to the officers that came to 
village for this purpose. With this act, they were expecting to better feed 
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themselves better with one less person at home and, more importantly, a possible 
future benefit from their son who could become a high ranking official. As 
proof, he states that there have been commanders that changed their route during 
the campaigns to see and make favors to their families. According to Yerasimos 
“the image of janissary that turning back to kill his infidel family” is a false or 
contrived idea that belongs to 19th century romantic nationalism. He 
steadfastedly claims that these devshirme soldiers or officials knew their 
hometowns and families, and continued their relationships.201 Whatever is 
written in the romantic nationalist histories of the Balkan states, Vatin, too, 
believes that with this practice Ottomans by no means aimed to brain-wash 
Christian youth, rather the goal was to sustain loyalty to the sultan.202 
 
 
4.2.1. Janissaries 
 
Turkish historians have a set of differing ideas regarding the nature and 
importance of the janissary army. Especially those that took Janissaries as a 
Christian army downplayed their importance. For instance, Đsmail Hami 
Danişmend argues that the role of Janissaries for the Ottoman expansion and 
success in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries was extremely exaggerated. He 
argues that at the heyday of the empire they made up maximum 10.000 soldiers 
and did not took active part in the conquests. For him the janissary force was 
solely a guardian unit that stood close to sultan and they did many things that 
benefitted the enemy, as well as direct acts against the sultan.203 
 
To Danişmend’s contrast, Yerasimos believes that janissary army achieved 
amazing successes, keeping in mind their limited number of 12.000. Although 
they were only one of the six infantry corps, their capabilities in the battlefields 
                                                           
201
 Yerasimos, S. (2001). Azgelismislik sürecinde Türkiye: 1. Bizans’tan Tanzimat’a. (B. Kuzucu, Trans.). 
Istanbul: Belge yayinlari. p. 297. 
202
 Vatin, N. in Mantran, R. (ed.). (1999). Osmanli Imparatorlugu tarihi. (S. Tanilli, Trans.) (2nd ed.). p. 65. 
203
 Danismend, I. H. (1971). İzahlı Osmanlı tarihi kronolojisi (Vol. 4). p.109. 
75 
 
were great.204 In Yerasimos conception, therefore, the janissary army is an 
extremely significant. Halil Đnalcık, in this regard, is in the same line with 
Yerasimos. Although smaller in number, he writes, Janissaries gave a clear 
superiority to the Ottomans as these soldiers were the first standing and 
organized army in Europe and were under direct command of the sultan.205 
Đnalcık, therefore, ascribes a special role to the janissary force, without caring to 
refer to issues that concern their ethnicity. 
 
Although he is not a historian, it is a fact that Necip Fazıl Kısakürek has an 
important influence on the understanding of history in the Turkish people’s 
minds with his books, such as Yeniçeri and Ulu Hakan Abdülhamid. He refers to 
the establishment of janissary army as a possibly useful novelty in order to 
“make use of the defeated ones” and protect the “Muslim and Turkish element”. 
However, he believes that this positive outcome could not be achieved. As the 
main reason, Necip Fazıl writes:  
 
“Unless the foreign element and blood are integrated into the body, 
insofar as the loss of their least bit of independence, by bashing them 
in the mortar of Islam and Turkishness, the result will be nothing but 
death. Thusly, after a short period of time, because it had not felt the 
due material and spiritual pressure upon itself, the Rum206 blood began 
to take revenge from the Turk in the Turkish army.”207  
 
He further discusses that the disaster that happened at Bayezid’s time was due to 
the foreign blood that established itself in the heart of the Ottoman state: 
Janissaries and Bayezid’s wife. Also, regarding the Haçova Battle where 
Janissaries deserted the battlefield, Necip Fazıl writes very explicitly: “The 
Janissary did what he would have done, but the pure blood of the Muslim-Turk 
saved his fatherland, sultan and the banner of the prophet”208 Another example 
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could be taken from the section that the killing of Osman II was explained: “The 
Young Osman disaster is the eternal spot that an army nurtured by poisonous 
and purulent foreign blood put on the honor of the Turk.”209  Necip Fazıl clearly 
claims that the “corrupt origins” of the janissary army and the established circle 
of treason that consisted of the courtiers and ulama (“the learned men”) class is 
the main reason for Ottoman decline throughout his book. 
 
Ziya Nur Aksun, another Islamist author, surprisingly deviates from Necip Fazıl 
as he completely ignores the Christian background of the janissary army. For 
instance the title he uses for the abolishment of the janissary army in 1826 is 
“The Sudden Abolition of The Janissary Heart: Our Long-Established Institution 
and the Strongest Foundation of the Ottoman Army” where he refers to the Ocak 
as a national establishment.210 Adding the fact that his neglect of the issues 
regarding the devshirme system, princesses Olivera Despina and Mara, as well 
as his approach to Janissaries in the whole book Đslam Tarihi, it could be 
concluded that Aksun tries to conceal the ‘ugly truth’ behind the Ottoman 
system and one is unlikely to expect from him a sophisticated analysis regarding 
the Ottoman history. 
 
Furthermore, Rıza Nur unexpectedly writes nothing negative about the 
Janissaries in the section that he explains the establishment that occurred at the 
time of Orhan.211 He simply states the new kanun that led to establishment of the 
Janissaries as an organized army. On the other hand, Rıza Nur’s approach to 
devshirme system that paved the way for Christians to become officials is 
extremely critical, unlike his stance on the janissary army. 
 
Yılmaz Öztuna writes about the janissary army with a slightly negative 
approach. He believes that Serbs constitute an important part in the janissary 
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army who were selected from “the most perfect” boys of the region.212 He 
describes the janissary army as the “heavy infantry force” of the “Turkish 
Army” that served to state throughout her history. Öztuna, like the plurality of 
the Turkish authors, does not believe that Janissaries were the force that made 
the most of the Ottoman conquests as many Europeans think.213 The reason for 
this exaggerating attitude by the western historians, according to Öztuna is to 
develop hatred against the Turks with “killing Christians by using Christians” 
thesis. He ascribes a weaker role to Janissaries and promotes the forces that 
consisted of Anatolian Turkish soldiers as the main dynamic behind the rapid 
expansion. Just as Halil Đnalcık argues that the number of soldiers should not be 
the primary concern for the comparison, Öztuna disagrees and mentions that at 
the heyday of the empire Janissaries total number were around 10.000, while 
Ottoman army’s number reached “hundreds of thousands”, therefore, 
“Janissaries could only be support units to the main army, hence; the real source 
of the Turkish army could not be found in the Janissaries” he writes.214 
 
Regarding the importance of the Janissaries and timarlis in the Ottoman army, 
Finkel believes that timarlis continued to play the leading role in the rapid 
expansion of the Ottoman Empire, especially into the Balkans. This belief is 
something that Finkel obviously agrees with the Turkish historians who claim 
that janissary role in the conquest have been exaggerated by many western 
scholars. However, Finkel draws a line between the fighting force and the ruling 
elite as she indicates that Ottoman state relied more and more on devshirmes in 
its bureaucracy while the role of Turkish warrior families diminished215 
 
4.2.2. Devshirme Pashas 
 
The number and highly influential nature of the devshirme pashas and ruling 
elite in the Ottoman Empire is a commonly dealt and discussed issue among the 
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historians from various angles. For instance, Finkel argues that the late fifteenth 
and sixteenth century’s bureaucrats of the empire were of Albanian, Bosnian, 
Greek, Bulgarian, Serbian and Croatian origin. Also Yerasimos writes that 20 
out of 24 grandviziers that took office from 1453 to 1566, the death of Suleyman 
I, were of kul origin.216 In this sense, the term Osmanlı/Ottoman becomes a 
signifier for the educated ruling class and the servants of the sultan without any 
reference to ethnicity. However, it is also true that over the time the ruling class 
became predominantly of Christian-born and non-Turkish origin.217  
 
At this point, Sina Akşin derives an idea from Ziya Gökalp and point out an 
interesting aspect of the empire. Gökalp compares the enderun schools with 
madrasas, where the first makes Christians the ruling elite of the empire, the 
latter makes the Turks Arabs. Akşin believes that it gives a significant idea about 
the nature of the empire which declared itself theocratic. While those from 
Muslim families cannot become administrators, Christian-borns could find 
themselves a place in the decision making process of the empire.218 
 
Unlike the mentioned distanced and analyzing attitudes, Islamist and nationalist 
historians have a clearly negative stance on the issue of devshirme 
administrators. To start with Rıza Nur, it is possible to claim that he uses the 
devshirme system as the natural opposite of Turkishness. For him this system 
leads to ruling of one state by non-nationals which results in disaster.219 These 
devshirme pashas, in Rıza Nur’s conception, are in total betrayal of the empire. 
He states “whenever they found an opportunity, they would escape and turn back 
to their homelands and became Christians again. They taught the secrets of the 
state to the enemy. They surrendered the fortresses that they were supposed to 
guard. To sum up, their betrayals are infinite.”220 The reason for Turkish rise in 
the early period of the Ottoman dynasty was due to the validity of Turkishness, 
Turkish customs and spirit. But with the inclusion of the devshirmes and foreign 
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sultan wives corruption and indecency started. Those of bad stock with unknown 
or suspicious origins stood against the Turkishness becoming an effective clique 
in the palace.221 Rıza Nur generally is not specific about the names and does not 
include much information about the origins of pashas; however, it is obvious 
from his usage of “Fatih the son of a cariye (concubine)” and extremely negative 
approach for devshirme pashas that he is highly critical and greatly emphasizes 
the anachronic Turkish ideals. 
 
Necip Fazıl, too, agrees with Rıza Nur regarding the Ottoman decline due to 
appointment of Serbian, Vlahian, Greek and other Christian-born officers, who 
were by definition anti-Turkish, instead of Turks.222 
 
Another historian that is critical about the devshirme system and its negative 
influence on the Ottoman Empire is Yılmaz Öztuna. He believes that the reign of 
Mehmed II is very significant in the establishment of devshirme bureaucracy. 
For him, Fatih’s support for devshirme bureaucrats was a “national sacrifice” in 
order to establish a central administration.223 Öztuna divides the ruling elite of 
the empire to two factions as one being the “Turkish Aristocracy Party” (“Türk 
Aristokrasi Partisi” - TAP) while the opposing other is the “Devshirme Party” 
(“Devşirme Partisi” - DP) throughout the section he writes about Mehmed II and 
Bayezid II. It all starts with the “important warnings and objections” of Çandarlı 
Halil Pasha to Mehmed II who eventually became victorious; hence, in the right 
due to his conquest of Constantinople and struggles in the Balkans. This 
situation led to the execution of Pasha. This act, according to Öztuna is one of 
the greatest mistakes on behalf of Mehmed II.224 It is his execution that made it 
possible for devshirmes, whose past and origins are suspicious or unknown, to 
became viziers and extremely influential for the state.225 Öztuna, although not as 
much as historians such as Rıza Nur, Đsmail Hami Danişmend and Necip Fazıl, 
is very critical with Fatih’s decision to support the devshirme bureaucrats in this 
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sense. In this regard, Zuhuri Danışman writes along the same lines of Yılmaz 
Öztuna. For instance Danışman states that the execution of Halil Pasha is due to 
the efforts of devshirme viziers and afterwards they will occupy the most 
important posts in the Ottoman bureaucracy (“ihtida edenler tarafından işgal 
edilmiştir”). Also Danışman points out that there have been some successful 
devshirme viziers among many useless and worthless ones who even could 
follow their origins and betrayed Turkishness.226 Overall, Danışman, though 
somewhat more sensitive, is among the historians that locate the devshirme 
system opposed to early Turkishness. 
 
Furthermore, with the death of Mehmed II, Öztuna writes even clearer regarding 
the two parties (TAP and DP), as if they are modern political parties. For 
instance, when Mehmed II dies, (obviously Turkish) ‘Karamani’ Mehmed Pasha 
tries to conceal it but “the men of the DP” spreads the news immediately to 
exploit the situation. Đshak Pasha from the DP immediately provokes the 
Janissaries and makes them kill his rival Karamani Mehmed Pasha. Zuhuri 
Danışman, too conveys these events with more or less with the same words, 
promoting “ethnically Turk, valuable statesman” Karamani Mehmed Pasha 
against the devshirme clique.227  Eventually Cem, who was expecting to become 
the sultan, could not achieve this goal and so docile Bayezid II rises to throne 
with the support of the DP. Surely he was going to comply with their requests.228 
Regarding the killing of the Karamani Mehmed Pasha, Finkel states that it 
“clearly demonstrated that the janissary corps, created by the Ottoman sultans to 
be their loyal guard and the elite force of their army, was an unreliable monster 
which put its own interests before those of its masters”229 which could be 
regarded as a credit to the historians that criticize the sinful acts of the 
Janissaries and devshirme pashas. The general outlook of Finkel’s narrative 
regarding the death of Mehmed II and the succession struggles that followed is 
similar to that of Öztuna who wrote somewhat moderately compared to Rıza 
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Nur, Đsmail Hami Danişmend and Necip Fazıl. However it should also be noted 
that she does not underline the TAP and the DP schism too much but anyway it 
exists underneath the text. 
 
Unlike any Turkish historian, Finkel openly writes about the origins of the 
grandviziers of Mehmed II. “Of Mehmed’s seven grand viziers, one was 
Turkish-born Muslim, two were Christian-born devshirmes, two were from 
Byzantine or Byzanto-Serbian nobility (Mahmud Pasha Angelovic and Gedik 
Ahmed Pasha) and one was Christian-born but of unknown origin” and 
“Mahmud Pasha Angelovic, a former Byzanto-Serbian noble, who built 
charitable and commercial institutions right outside Grand Bazaar today. The 
district was named after him”230 writes Finkel. Apparently it is known for 
Turkish historians like, Danişmend and Öztuna that many of these grandviziers 
were of Christian origin. Although they do not give specific detail about the 
pashas231, as Finkel does, it seems at least there is an agreement regarding the 
fact that concerns their background. However, as it was his practice before, Ziya 
Nur Aksun deviates from the mentioned Turkish historians as he prefers to write 
about how a knowledgeable, pious and good Muslim Mahmud Pasha was but 
includes no information regarding his or other pashas’ ethnic background. 
Keeping in mind the Aksun’s general writing style, it is hard to think that this 
attitude is due to an Ottomanist and inclusive ideology. It could be claimed that 
he finds this kind of information dangerous because it might mislead Muslim 
Turkish readers and therefore does not incorporate such details into his narrative. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CO	CLUSIO	 
 
The intention with the writing of this thesis was mainly to understand the 
differing perceptions among the popular historians with regards to the common 
histories of Serbia and the Ottoman Empire. Also, trying to observe the validity 
of the groupings of the historians was an important goal. 
 
In the first chapter, which is concerned with the period of 1350-1475, significant 
events, such as; the Battle of Maritsa, struggles for supremacy in Anatolia, the 
Battle of Kosovo, the Battle of Ankara and the annexation of Serbia, were 
evaluated through the narratives of popular historians as well as literary works. 
 
With a similar approach, in the second chapter, a reading and an evaluation of 
the eventful nineteenth century with regards to Serbia and Ottoman Empire was 
done. Especially authors’ approach to the issue of nationalism and their reaction 
to gradual independence of Serbia were observed.  
 
In the final chapter, prominent Serbian characters in the Ottoman history as well 
as devshirme pashas and Janissaries were in focus in order to derive a better 
image of Serbs in the Turkish popular historiography. By going over specific 
personalities and with a comparative approach, it was aimed to picture and 
locate these characters with more sensitivity in the common history of Serbia 
and Ottoman Empire. 
 
In order to achieve the goals that were defined prior to writing and the research, 
the narratives of authors with differing backgrounds, namely; nationalist, 
extreme rightist, Islamist and leftist, were scanned and compared not only with 
each other but also with scholarly written works of the academics as reference 
points. 
 
In doing this, specific attention was paid to subjects of nationalism (i.e. national 
terminology, ethnonyms, nationalist historiography etc.) and the nature and the 
structure of the Ottoman Empire during the given periods. For nationalism and 
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nationalist historiography works of Benedict Anderson, Ernest Gellner, Miroslav 
Hroch, Etienne Copeaux and Büşra Ersanlı Behar were utilized. On the nature of 
the Ottoman Empire, especially the early period, the framework and the 
approaches provided by Cemal Kafadar and Heath Lowry were highly useful. 
 
It was quite interesting to observe how the history and historiography was 
deployed and instrumentalised, historical facts were omitted and modified. It 
was also seen, with concrete examples in the popular historiography, that the 
historical evaluation and narration could be done not as it is, but rather as it 
supposed to be,232 especially with the impact of the nation-state idea and 
nationalism which were neither valid nor existent during the period that is in 
question. Hence the narratives of the popular historians, such as; Rıza Nur, 
Yılmaz Öztuna and Ziya Nur Aksun, become instructive lessons where the good 
and bad are shown to the reader without the needed discussion.233 
 
Furthermore, as it was underlined in the beginning, the groupings were designed 
in order to evaluate the authors and have a more meaningful discussion. This 
approach helped a lot in understanding the rationale behind the erroneous 
information and misleading approaches as political engagements could indicate 
the real audience to whom the author is writing. For instance, while Ziya Nur 
Aksun, an Islamist author, is very sensitive (i.e. either selective or protectionist) 
in issues that could harm the religious feeling that is attached to the Empire or a 
sultan, rightist historians underline and glorify the Turkishness of the Ottoman 
Empire.  
 
Overall, it could be beneficial to underline several problematic issues and 
arguments with regards to the popular historiography. An approach that could be 
formulized as ‘the nationalist distortion’ (“milliyetçi çarpıtma”) is appeared to 
be an all-pervading one, especially for nationalist, extreme rightist and Islamist 
popular historians.  
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Firstly, it is frequently observed that authors, such as, Đsmail Hami Danişmend, 
Rıza Nur, Yılmaz Öztuna and Ziya Nur Aksun, either overlook or attach 
unnecessary negativity to the cases that Serbian existence was evident, even 
beneficial. This attitude especially materializes in the narrations regarding the 
struggles in Anatolia in the late fourteenth century, the Battle of Ankara (1402) 
and characters of Olivera Despina and Stefan Lazarević.  
 
Secondly, the approach of ‘us, the Turks’ vs. ‘Serbs the enemies’ is observed 
which implies a direct connection between the armies and societies of the 
fourteenth century and those of the twenty-first century. In this regard Cemal 
Kafadar’s warning is notable. He states “[t]he essentialist trap cannot be avoided 
unless we, the historians, problematize the use of "the Turks" (or any other 
ethnonym for that matter), systematically historicize it and confront its plasticity, 
and study its different meanings over time and place”.234  
 
Thirdly, none of the popular historians seem to grasp the state structure, 
vassaldom system and mosaic-like nature of the early Ottoman era. It is, almost 
without exception, indicated that Serbia was a monolithic entity that acted 
similar to a contemporary nation-state. 
 
Also it has to be said that the lack of attention on behalf of the leftist historians is 
surprising. Especially Doğan Avcıoğlu is far from being international in the 
sense that the leftist point of view requires and his emphasis is solely on the 
Turks and the Turkish experience. 
 
However; it was also seen that the particular issue that is in question and 
personal attachments of the author could make him deviate from the group that 
he was thought in the first place. In this regard two examples were striking. The 
first one is the deviation of Zuhuri Danışman who was thought to be in the 
nationalist group in the beginning. Yet his approach for and openness in the 
issues regarding the Serbs renders him a dissimilar figure. It is even possible to 
call him, maybe not with the contemporary standards but relatively speaking, a 
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liberal historian. Secondly a divergence between two Islamist author, namely; 
Ziya Nur Aksun and Necip Fazıl Kısakürek became apparent. As mentioned, 
Ziya Nur Aksun has an extremely protectionist and glorifying approach to the 
Ottoman history. However, Necip Fazıl’s general attitude towards the Ottoman 
administration, especially for sultans like Bayezid I, is accusive for not acting in 
accordance with the interests of the Turks and letting the foreign blood in which 
renders him very much in line with the nationalist group. That is to say, while 
the groupings are useful in making explanatory generalizations and 
understanding the general idea, it might also overshadow the diversifications. 
 
It could be concluded that from this point onward a similar study for the post-
1990s (i.e. post-Yugoslavia) historiography in the Turkish Republic on the 
common histories of Serbia and Ottoman Empire and even a survey that could 
deduce the average image of the Serb in the Turkish society could be conducted 
which would be a complementary one to this work in order to understand the 
impact that Bosnian War of 1992-1995 has made. 
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